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1. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been variously estimated that one out of six 
couplesl or 15-20 percent of couples 2 1 are infertile. The 
changes in social attitudes and social welfare policies 
towards single mothers together with the increased use of 
contraception and abortion mean that the demand for 
adoptable babies now surpasses the supply. Those infertile 
couples who are frustrated by the long adoption procedures 
and are unable to be helped through the Artificial 
Insemination by Donor (AID) or In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) 
programmes are turning in increasing numbers 3 to a practice 
with a long history which has only recently gained 
world-wide attention - the practice of surrogate 
motherhood. 
The practice of surrogacy dates back at least to 
Biblical times. One of the first recorded instances is 
found in the Old Testament. Almost 4 000 years ago Sarah, 
the wife of Abraham, could not conceive and sent her husband 
to her Egyptian maid Hagar saying "It may be that I may 
obtain children by her". 4 Hagar thus bore Ismael. Another 
example is that of Rachel, wife of Jacob, who required Billa 
to "bear upon my knees that I may also have a child by 
her". 5 Jacob's other wife, Leah, had the same arrangement 
with her slave-girl Zilpah.6 
2. 
Today, surrogate motherhood has provoked considerable 
debate on the moral, ethical, legal, and social 
consequences, issues to which existing legislation has 
failed adequately to address itself. In a jurisdiction 
where no specific legislation on surrogacy exists, the 
application of existing laws produce distorted results 
which are beyond the probable legislative intent. Where 
specific legislation prohibits the practice of surrogacy, it 
has failed to recognize long term implications of such 
prohibition. 
Most of the known cases of surrogacy arrangements 
involve the insemination of the surrogate with the sperm of 
the husband of the infertile couple. The insemination of 
the surrogate with the sperm of a person other than the 
husband of the infertile couple is, of course, a 
possibility, but would probably be a method resorted to only 
where both the wife and husband are infertile. In this 
case, the resultant child has no genetic link with his 
intended parents. The expression infertile couple in this 
paper is used to denote a couple where the wife is incapable 
of bearing, or carrying to term, a child. 
Discussion in this paper is limited to infertile 
couples who participate in surrogacy arrangements by the 
most common means of the artificial insemination of the 
surrogate by the sperm of the husband. It is by the use of 
such a practice that the major ethical and legal issues arise. 
3. 
Recent developments in the field of In Vitro 
Fertilization now enable an embryo to be implanted in a 
woman who is not the genetic mother of the embryo. In the 
case of a surrogacy arrangement, the surrogate becomes the 
gestational or 'host' mother and where the couple have both 
contributed the genetic material, they are the genetic 
parents. Three other possibilities become available with 
the use of the technique of embryo transfer. The first is 
where an embryo consisting of the wife's ovum fertilized by 
donor sperm is implanted in the surrogate. In this case, 
only the wife has a genetic link to the resultant child. 
The second is where an embryo consisting entirely of donated 
genetic material is implanted in the surrogate. In this 
. case,neither the couple nor the surrogate have genetic links 
with the resultant child. It is difficult to envisage the 
circumstances in which such an arrangement would be resorted 
to. The third possibility is where an embryo consisting of 
the ovum of a donor fertilized by the sperm of the husband 
is implanted in the surrogate. In such a case, the child has 
a genetic link to the husband. In all cases involving 
embryo transfer, the surrogate would be the gestational 
mother, and most of the legal and ethical issues relevant in 
the case where the surrogate herself has contributed genetic 
. material to the child may not be as relevant. 
Although it is possible to understand the desire of 
single man, or a. single woman, or a homesexual couple to use 
4. 
the services of a surrogate mother, the issues raised in 
such an arrangement involve different considerations from 
those inherent in arrangements made by infertile couples. 
The participation in a surrogacy arrangement by a 
single person means intentionally depriving a child of a 
second parent. 7 Certainly society can do little to prevent 
a woman from becomingpregnant, whether she is single or 
married. However, by the rules of nature and the conditions 
imposed by most communities, a single man has much more 
difficulty in deliberately creating a child with the 
intention of being its sole parent. The basic reason for 
allowing a couple to use artificial reproductive techniques 
is to enable the couple to fulfil their love through 
procreation. 8 This argument can be extended to surrogacy 
which may be viewed as a form of artificial reproduction. 
Through the use of simple artificial insemination 
procedures not involving medical intervention, 8 a homosexual 
couple may become 'parents' of a child born to a surrogate. 
However the use of a surrogacy arrangement in these 
circumstances raises serious social implications for the 
child and for the accepted elements of what constitutes the 
basic unit of society - the family. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the major 
problems inhibiting the use of surrogacy, including existing 
legislation, concerns of public policy and judicial 
5. 
decisions and comments. 
In the findings of the committees formed in various 
jurisdictions to look into the issue of surrogacy 
arrangements, it is noted that the majority of the reports 
favour prohibition of the practice of surrogacy and two of 
the jurisdictions have enacted legislation accordingly. 
In Canada, the province of Ontario favours the use of 
surrogacy through legislative control, as do some of the 
States in the United States. These reports and relevant 
legislation are evaluated with a view to comparing the 
attitudes in different jurisdictions. 
The effectiveness of private contract in surrogacy 
. arrangements as practised in the United States is examined 
and compared with the use of legislation to control such 
arrangements. The arguments for and against the 
prohibition of surrogacy are presented, with the conclusion 
that legislation allowing and regulating the practice of 
surrogacy is to be preferred in order to protect the welfare 
_ of all the parties, especially that of the child. 
6. 
CHAPTER 2 
MOTIVATION TO PARTICIPATE IN SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS 
• Definition of Surrogacy 
The term surrogate motherhood or surrogacy is most 
commonly used to denote the procedure by which a woman 
produces a child by becoming impregnated with the sperm of 
the husband of an infertile wife or, in rare occasions where 
the husband is also sterile, by the sperm of another man, 10 
and surrenders 	all parental rights over the resultant 
child to the husband and his wife. The couple (intended 
parents) then take steps formally to adopt the child. The 
child may, in some cases, be handed over to the couple and 
registration details may be falsified to hide the true 
parentage. 
In the most common case, the term "surrogate mother", 
which strictly interpreted means substitute mother, is a 
misnomer. The woman who is impregnated in fact contributes 
the egg and uterus and is not therefore a substitute mother 
but is the genetic mother. The wife who rears any child 
born thereafter becomes the social mother or substitute 
mother as she parents a child borne by another woman. 
Motivation of Infertile Couple 
What motivates an infertile couple to seek an 
arrangement with a surrogate - an arrangement which is 
widely disapproved of, has no protection in law, and in some 
7. 
instances may be prohibited by the law? In a poll conducted 
by a research organization in 1982 in Australia and Great 
Britain, 11 it was found that in Australia, 32 percent of 
those people questioned thought the practice of surrogacy 
should be permitted while 44 percent were against the 
practice and 24 percent had no opinion. In Britain, only 25 
percent were in favour of the practice while 55 percent were 
against it. The data did not reveal the reason why opinion 
was against the practice of surrogacy, but writers Singer 
and Wells 12 consider •that such an opinion may have 
sprung from a distaste of the idea of a woman giving up to 
another a baby to whom she has given birth. 
The main reasons for seeking a surrogacy arrangement 
are the inability of the wife to either conceive a child or 
carry a child to term and the desire of the couple to found 
a family. These reasons are similar to the reasons why 
couples seek In Vitro Fertilization procedures. A surrogacy 
arrangement is the only chance to have a child who has a 
genetic relationship to at least one of the couple. Where 
'adoption is not available, it is the only chance for an 
infertile couple to have any sort of a child. 
According to Keane and Breo, 13 the husband of an 
infertile woman, in keeping with the feelings of most other 
men, experiences a strong need to have a child who is 
biologically his own. In seeking a surrogate, the couple 
are acknowledging this need. 
8. 
The use of surrogacy as a matter of convenience 
because, for example, the wife does not wish to interrupt 
her career, is a far more controversial matter. It is easy 
to criticize a woman who uses the services of a surrogate 
for reasons other than medical necessity, yet the long 
established practice . of mothers leaving their children in 
the care of nannies, nurses, wet nurses, baby sitters and 
day care centres is widely accepted. However, given 
society's reluctance to accept surrogacy in cases of 
necessity, it is unlikely that surrogacy for reasons of 
convenience would be readily accepted. 
Right to Found a Family 
The basic unit of society is the family and most couples 
feel the need to create a family unit. Couples seeking to 
-participate in surrogacy arrangements may be supported in their 
desires by the fact that various international agreements provide 
for the right to found a family. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Riqhts 14 
states that the family is the natural and fundamental group unit 
of society. 15 However, it also gives special mention of the 
right of every child to such protection on the part of his 
family, society, and the State as is required by his status as a 
minor. 16 
9. 
The right to found a family is further restricted by the 
provisions of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child 17 to 
which Australia is a signatory. The Declaration provides that a 
child shall, wherever possible, grow up in the care of his 
parents and shall not "save in exceptional circumstances be 
separated from his mother". 18  The Declaration also sees the need 
for the child to be protected against all forms of exploitation 
and not be subject to trafficking in any form. 19 
The relevance of the Declaration to the practice of 
surrogacy lies in the fact that, on the face of it, surrogacy 
contravenes the sentiments of the Declaration. In the usual 
surrogacy arrangements, the child is separated from his mother, 
the surrogate is paid a fee, and the child is relinquished to 
another set of 'parents'. This may be viewed as a form of 
trafficking depending on the attitude taken towards the fact of 
payment made to surrogates. 20 Any legislation relating to 
surrogacy needs to take into account these special provisions 
protecting the interests of every child. However, as the 
Declaration is of moral force only, a failure to comply with 
these provisions would not affect the validity of such 
legislation. 
In the United States, the right of choice in matters of 
abortion and procreation and the right to beget and bear 
children are well established. 21 The right to enter into a 
surrogacy arrangement may be inferred from the right not to 
procreate through contraception and abortion and from 
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the right to privacy which was recognized by the Supreme 
Court in Griswold v Connecticut. 22 However, such 
fundamental rights may be justifiably regulated where 
compelling State interest so dictates, but only to the 
extent that is necessary to protect the conflict of interest 
between the freedom of the individual in organizing his or 
her private life and the interest of the State in its role 
as parens patriae. In the case of Roe v Wade, 23 the Supreme 
Court held that after the first trimester of pregnancy, the 
State may regulate abortion in any way which is reasonably 
necessary to preserve the life or health of the pregnant 
woman. 
The Supreme Court's view that the "outer limits of .... 
privacy have not been marked by the court" 24 may support the 
suggestion that in the United States a right to practice 
surrogacy arises from the right to privacy. However, the 
commercial aspect of surrogacy may be a sufficient 
compelling State interest to justify the regulation of 
surrogacy. 
11. 
Motivation of Surrogates 
A woman may seek to be a surrogate for a variety of 
reasons. An initial study of 125 women applying to provide 
surrogate mothering services 25 found various emotional 
reasons for the willingness of a woman to bear a child for 
another. This ranged from the enjoyment of being pregnant, 
the need to assuage guilt feelings of a previous abortion or 
adoption, the desire to help others, to the desire for 
financial gain. 
From his study, Parker 26 concluded that participation 
as a surrogate mother gave a woman who had lost her child 
through abortion or adoption a chance to redeem herself and 
to assuage her feelings of guilt. However, Sappideen 27 
questions whether participating as a surrogate mother.will 
have a redemptive effect, given -that. such,participation 
is not generally an acceptable activity by society. 
If the surrogate sees the arrangement as a means of 
earning money, there is the possibility that she may not be 
altogether frank about her medical history and be less than 
careful about her health during pregnancy. It has been 
found that blood donors who are paid for their blood 
• deliberately conceal any personal information which may 
debar them from donating their blood. 28 It appears that a 
person who sells his blood because of a need to earn money 
is less likely to reveal any medical problems he may have. 
ti 
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In the case of a surrogacy arrangement, adequate 
medical and psychological screening before being accepted as 
a surrogate would help in discovering any potential 
difficulties in this area. A materialistic view to a 
surrogacy agreement may add stress to the surrogate, who is 
already in what may be regarded as a stressful situation. A 
surrogate who is motivated by purely financial 
considerations may not feel very committed to the wellbeing 
of the unborn child. She may also experience conflicting 
f emotions between her nurturing role and her financial 
! motives. Stress may have an adverse effect on the unborn 
child and may give rise to an increase in perinatal death, 
congenital abnormalities, accidental injuries during 
pregnancy or a difficult labour. 29 However, it is not clear 
how far studies on the adverse effect stress has on a 
- pregnant woman can be related to the position of a 
surrogate. 
In his study, Parker found that 89% of the women 
surveyed, required a fee for their services. 30 If payment 
to the surrogate covers more than the reasonable costs 
incurred in connection with the pregnancy and childbirth, it 
may appear to be payment in exchange for the child. Such 
payment may be viewed as an offence against those provisions 
. of the various adoption legislations which prohibit payment 
made in consideration of the adoption of a child, and the 
transfer of the possession of the child or the making of 
13. 
arrangements, with a view to the adoption of a child. 31 Any 
payment made to reimburse for actual expenditure may be 
outside the ambit of those provisions. 
Although at first glance an altruistic motive may be 
seen in a laudatory light, there are problems which are 
similar to those encountered in the area of organ donation. 
Altruism may be regarded as a gift relationship between the 
parties which imposes an obligation to receive and to repay 
in equivalent value. 32 
In the field of organ donation, it has been suggested 33 
that a_family might bring subtle pressure to bear on one of 
its members to donate an organ such as a kidney. In such a 
case, the recipient of such a donation may feel unable to 
refuse the gift and continue to feel obligated towards the 
donor. The donor, on his part, may consider the recipient 
as an extension of himself and may exhibit proprietary 
interest in the conduct of the recipient. 
Where there is no personal relationship involved in the 
donation of an organ, this sense of obligation to give, to 
accept, and to repay would more likely be absent. Where a 
donation is given without payment, such as the case of an 
unpaid blood donor, it can be said to be an act of altruism 
- an act for the benefit of society without reimbursement.34 
14. 
Where relatives are involved in a surrogate motherhood 
arrangement, the mixing of kinship is confusing and not in 
the best interest of the child or the natural mother. The 
surrogate, as a member of the family, remains in contact 
with the child, often in the role of a more distant 
relative, such as an aunt. The situation is analogous to 
grandparent adoptions where the natural mother is known as 
the sister. The surrogate may be reluctant to relinquish 
all control over the child and be unable to accept the 
secondary role. 
Confidentiality in Surrogacy Arrangements 
The reason for anonymity in organ donation cases is to 
minimize the sense of obligation and identification. 35 
Whether the identity of the surrogate mother should be 
confidential is analogous to adoption and artificial 
insemination by donor situations. While the sperm donor in 
an artificial insemination procedure is assured of 
• confidentiality, the surrogate, who in the majority of cases 
is also the ovum donor, is generally known by the infertile 
couple. Even if the surrogate is not personally known, the 
details of her medical history, education, background, and 
physical features would be made known to the couple before 
the surrogacy arrangement proceeded. 36 
15. • 
Considering the length of time and effort involved in 
producing a child, the possibility of a woman acting as a 
surrogate mother more than once is very remote. Therefore 
the likelihood of an incestuous marriage, the main 
consideration for revealing identity, is also very remote. 
However, as is often the situation in adoption cases, a 
child may have a strong psychological desire to know its 
biological parent as well as a need to know the medical 
background of its biological family. On the other hand, if 
the experience in the area of kidney donation can be applied 
to surrogacy, the identities of the parties should not be 
revealed. 
Conclusion 
Ideally, financial gain should not be the primary 
factor which encourages a natural parent to relinquish 
parental rights. This results in decisions being made which 
may not be in the best interests of the natural parent or 
child. The motives of a surrogate may affect her attitude 
towards the unborn child which may result in a standard of 
care below that which is necessary for the well being of the 
child. 
It may be argued that the transfer of custody of a 
child is not in the best interests of a child if financial 
gain is the factor which motivates a woman to enter into a 
surrogacy agreement. However, at the time the agreement is 
16. 
made, it is not the welfare of the child which is the focal 
point but the hopes of the infertile couple and the 
financial needs of the surrogate. The fact of a profit 
motive may well justify regulation of surrogacy agreements 
but is not an argument for prohibiting_them. The surrogate 
is not paid only for her consent to the adoption but more 
for her personal services in conceiving, bearing, and 
delivering the child for the infertile couple and is 
compensation for the loss of income, pain and suffering. 
The motivation of a surrogate in participating in, a 
■.1 
surrogacy arrangement may well have an effect on the 
well-being of the unborn child. However, apart from the 
very few cases of family surrogacy arrangements, it is 
unlikely that a woman will undergo the arduous and 
potentially hazardous experience of pregnancy and childbirth 
without being adequately compensated for all the factors 
involved. This is not to say that the profit motive 
overrides any other reasons the surrogate may have. As Kim 
Cotton expressed the matter, "It wasn't a case of having a 
baby for money, it was more a case of wanting a way to bring 
in some money that would make me feel worthwhileu.37 
17. 
CHAPTER 3 
REPORTS AND LEGISLATION IN AUSTRALIAN AND OVERSEAS JURISDICTIONS 
Since 1982, governments throughout Australia have 
become increasingly concerned about the issues raised by the 
development in reproductive techniques, especially as it 
affects the status of the children born as a result of 
scientific breakthroughs to alleviate infertility. A brief 
look at the reports of the various committees set in this 
country, and in United Kingdom, Canada, and United States 
with special regard to the practice of surrogacy reveals a 
generally consistent approach in principle against the 
practice. 38 
Commonwea Zth 
The Commonwealth did not set up a government committee, 
but the Family Law Council did establish the Asche 
Committee." 
The Asche Committee specifically agreed with the 
Warnock Committee" that the State should not permit any 
surrogacy agreements on the ground that .... "as a matter of 
public policy, surrogacy arrangements are seen to be 
contrary to the welfare and interests of the child". 41 
Such agreements should be null, void, and unenforseable, 
with criminal sanctions against the exchange of money or the 
use of advertisements. 42 However, a woman and a couple 
entering a surrogacy agreement for altruistic reasons should 
18. 
not be subject to any criminal penalty. The Asche Committee 
believed that legislation prohibiting the practice of 
surrogacy would prevent surrogacy agreements. The argument 
that a woman should be free to use her body as she wished 
was rejected by the Asche Committee as it failed to take 
account of the welfare of the child and left the woman at 
risk of exploitation. 
A national uniform approach to the issues arising out 
the practice of surrogacy was advocated by the Asche 
Committee to deal with the social, moral, legal and ethical 
questions.43 
Victoria 
In Victoria the Waller Committee issued its final 
Report in August 1984. 44 
In this report, the Waller Committee opposed the 
practice of surrogacy, whether by natural or by artificial 
insemination, or by E.T. The Committee condemned the buying 
and selling of a baby which it saw as being the core of 
surrogacy agreements. 45 The Committee recommended that 
commercial surrogacy arrangements should not be part of an 
IVF programme. " 
The Waller Committee also addressed the issue of 
voluntary surrogacy without any element of commerce but had 
grave doubts that such an arrangement would be in the best 
19. 
interest of the child, given the problems raised by the 
surrogate's refusal to relinquish the child. 47 
As a result of the recommendations of the Waller 
Committee, the State of Victoria enacted legislation aimed 
at surrogacy agreements. At the date of writing, it is the 
only State in Australia to do so. 
Section 30(2) of the Infertility (Medical Procedures)  
Act 198448 makes it an offence to publish a statement, 
advertisement, or notice inducing a person to act as a 
surrogate or stating a woman is willing to act as one, and 
to receive payment or reward for consideration for the 
making of a surrogacy agreement or for acting as a 
surrogate. This differs from similar legislation in the 
United Kingdom as this provision bans payment between the 
surrogate and the couple. The penalty imposed for 
contravention is 50 units ($5,000) or imprisonment for 2 
years. Section 30(3) provides that a surrogacy contract or 
agreement is void. 49 The use of the word "void" in this 
context may merely mean unenforceable and not that the 
contract or agreement is illegal. 
Subsection (1) of section 30 provides, by way of 
reference, a definition of a surrogate mother. 
This definition appears to be limited to those women 
who are resident in Victoria and therefore advertisements or 
notices published in Victoria which are prohibited under 
20. 
subsection (2) if addressed to potential surrogates resident 
in Victoria, may be valid if aimed at securing the services 
of a surrogate resident outside Victoria. The prohibition 
will not hinder those determined to seek a surrogate. 
Queens land 
In Queensland, the Demack Committee released its Report 
in March 1984. 50 
The Demack Committee reached the same conclusion as the 
Asche Committee' and the Waller Committee in that it 
recommended that it should be made illegal to advertise for 
surrogates 51  but did not consider it desirable at present 
to make surrogacy arrangements criminal offences. 52 The 
Demack Committee also recommended that a surrogacy agreement 
be null, void, and unenforceable on the ground of public 
policy. 53 
On the matter of the use of donor gametes, the 
Committee considered that the public welfare did not require 
legislative banning of the use of donor sperm but it was not 
unanimous on the question of banning donor ova. The 
Committee agreed that donor sperm should only be used if 
medical reasons dictate their use. As for donor ovum, any 
embryo transfer should only be made to the infertile wife of 
the couple.54 
21. 
The Demack Committee examined the issues involved in 
surrogacy in the light of ethical considerations in 
protecting the basic moral values of the community. It 
considered the rights and protection of the child as 
provided for in the Human Rights Commission Act 1981 of the 
Commonwealth and the United Nations Declaration of the  
Rights of the Child, 1959. 
The Committee did not claim it was expressing the mind 
of the community, or even the majority of the community. 
Indeed, it is clear from the submissions made to the 
Committee that there is no consensus in the community 
regarding fundamental ethical issues involved in modern 
reproductive techniques and procedures. This made the task 
of promulgating ethical guidelines even more difficult. 
The Committee endeavoured to enunciate certain principles to 
underline the many issues involved. 
Tasmania 
The Chalmers Committee issued its Final Report in 
June 1985. 55 
The Chalmers Committee was of the opinion that the 
practice of surrogacy in general and commercial surrogacy 
agreements in particular are unacceptable to the Tasmanian 
community at the present time and recommends that the 
practice of surrogacy should not be recognized as an 
acceptable procedure for the alleviation of infertility in 
22. 
Tasmania. Yet the Committee fell short of prohibiting such 
procedures, believing that there is a possibility of 
permitting surrogate procedures in certain cases in the 
future. The Committee did not believe that criminal 
penalties were an appropriate means of controlling the 
practice of surrogacy but considered regulation by specific 
legislation to be in the best interest of the child. Such 
regulation would ensure that surrogacy agreements are 
controlled by the existing State agencies and would prohibit 
any private surrogacy agreement. Any financial recompense 
should be limited to the reasonable expenses incidental to 
the pregnancy and birth. 
Amendments to the Status of Children Act 1974 (Tas.) 
have already been discussed. 56 	The position in Tasmania is 
that, although like its Victorian counterpart the 
legislation establishes maternity in cases of donor ovum, 
unlike South Australia, Victoria, and New South Wales, it 
does not recognize de facto relationships and therefore 
children born in such circumstances fall outside the ambit 
of the legislation. This anomaly may cause hardship to • 
those de facto couples who, having undergone the relevant 
fertilization procedures in those States, settle in Tasmania 
and find that the law here does not recognize the legal 
status of any children born as a result of those procedures. 
23. 
• New South Wales 
The New South Wales Law Reform Commission is to conduct 
a full review of the issues involved in the practice of 
surrogacy but has yet to proceed with this project but has 
published a report on human artificial insemination. 57 
In the meantime, the Artificial Conception Act 1984 58 
was enacted to provide for the paternity and legal status of 
a child born as a result of the use of donated sperm. It 
encompasses de facto couples, unlike the Tasmanian legislation, 
but does not provide for the maternity of a child in the 
case of a donated ovum. Recent amendments made by the Children 
(Equality of Status) Amendment Act 1984 59 provide in section 
18A(2)(d) that the presumption which exists by virtue of section 
60 11(1) of the Children (Equality of Status) Act 1976 	prevails 
over the conflicting irrebuttable presumption under section 
61 6 of the Artificial Conception Act 1984- 	which presumes 
the semen donor not to be the father. It appears that the 
amendments may provide a means for recognizing biological 
paternity in surrogacy cases. 62 Under section 11(1), a man, 
may execute a paternity acknowledgment that he is the father 
of an ex-nuptial child and if it is countersigned by the 
mother or recorded in the appropriate register, that man is 
presumed, for all purposes, to be the father of the child. 
In this way, biological paternity, although initially 
precluded, may be re-instated and a rebuttable presumption 
is deemed to prevail over an irrebuttable presumption. 
South Australia 
24 
In South Australia the Working Party on In Vitro 
Fertilization and Artificial Insemination by Donor 63 
recommended that no change be made to the law to permit the 
practice of surrogacy. It did so on the grounds of the 
social complications which may arise from surrogacy 
agreements such as the surrogate's refusal to hand over the 
child, the illegality of payment being made in relation to 
the adoption of the child and concern of public policy. It 
would appear therefore, that the Working Party viewed 
surrogacy in the context of existing legislation and 
concluded that the existing law already prohibited the 
practice of surrogacy. 
The Family RelationshipsAmendment Act 1984, 64 as is 
the case with the Victorian Act, provides for establishing 
paternity and maternity where donor gametes are used. The 
Working Party considered that the legislation provides a 
satisfactory basis on which a child may be legally 
recognized as the child of the marriage or the de facto  
relationship. 
Unlike the position as evident from the New South Wales 
legislation, it did not like the use of the term "artificial 
conception" as it considered that it is the procedure used 
to fertilize the gametes which is artificial and not the 
conception. 
2 5. 
Western Australia 
The Meadows Committee was established with its term of 
reference confined to IVF. An Interim Report was released 
65 . in August 1984 	In which the Meadows Committee recommended 
that an evaluation of IVF in Western Australia to provide 
information as to the results and effects of IVF in order to 
further assist it in its work especially relating to de 
facto couples. 
The Artificial Conception Act 1985, 66 as with the 
Victorian, South Australian, and Tasmanian legislation, 
establishes both paternity and maternity, including where 
donor gametes are used. Section 6(1) of that Act provides 
that the husband is the father of a child born as a result 
of a fertilization procedure undertaken by his Wife with his 
consent. Where donated ovum is used in such a procedure, 
with the consent of the husband, section 5(1) provides that ' 
the wife is the mother of the child. Section 7 denies 
parentage to the donor of any ovum, or the donor of any 
sperm (who is not the wife's husband) used in the 
fertilization procedure. The Act, unlike its Tasmanian 
counterpart, applies to "de facto" and "legal" spouses. The 
provisions establishing paternity and maternity (sections 5 
and 6) apply only to these spouses. Section 7, however, 
precludes parentage of the donors of genetic material, 
whether or not the woman who becomes pregnant has a "legal" 
or "de facto" spouse. The Act is silent as to the paternity 
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(and maternity) of a child born to such a woman. Similarly, 
where the woman is married, and her husband does not consent 
to the procedure, the Act is inapplicable. It is 
• unfortunate that the Act perpetuates the legal fiction 
approach to paternity by using terminology which presumes 
that the husband has caused the pregnancy (subsection (1)(a) 
of section 6). As was pointed out in the Interim Report of 
the Asche Committee, 67 the role of the law is discredited 
when actual fact is misrepresented by law. A better 
approach is that used in the United States and also in the 
68 Tasmanian legislation 	whereby the husband is treated in 
law as if he were the father. 
United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, the Warnock Committee made 
certain recommendations relating to the practice of 
69 surrogacy in its report presented in June 1984. 	The 
Warnock Committee unanimously agreed that surrogacy merely 
for the convenience of the wife, is "totally ethically 
70 unacceptable". 
To the majority, the danger of exploitation outweighed 
the potential benefits to such an extent that they were 
unable to even approve of non-profit making surrogacy 
services. The Warnock Committee therefore proposed to 
render criminal the operation of both profit and non-profit 
making surrogacy organizations. 71 Also liable to 
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prosecution should be the actions of any person who 
knowingly assists in the establishment of a surrogate 
pregnancy. 72 This latter recommendation was intended to 
cover any form of advertisement in relation to a proposed 
surrogacy and even women who become surrogates and may even 
cover the infertile couple as well. Finally, the Warnock 
Committee recommended that all surrogacy agreements be 
illegal contracts and therefore unenforceable in the 
courts. 73 It would appear that no prosecution is envisaged 
against the infertile couple, although the agreement is 
rendered illegal. 
It has been suggested 74 that a criminal sanction is 
unlikely to be effective since parties to a surrogacy 
arrangement need merely to assert that normal sexual 
intercourse occurred between the surrogate and the genetic 
father of the child who subsequently agreed to bring up the 
child. It is not unusual for a putative father to take such 
actions or even to pay substantial compensation or alimony 
to the mother of his illegitimate child. 
Following the public outcry which followed the Baby 
Cotton Case in January 1985, 75 which involved a child born 
to an English woman for an American couple as result of a 
surrogacy arrangement made through an American agency, the 
Government rushed through Parliament the Surrogate 
Arrangements Act 1985 (U.K.). Although the Earl of 
Caithness (acting on behalf of the Government in the House 
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of Lords) denied that this was the reason behind the Act, 76 
the Secretary of State for Social Services (Mr. Norman 
Fowler) stated that this was in fact the situation during 
the Second Reading in the House of Commons. 77 The Act falls 
short of implementing all of the recommendations of the 
Warnock Committee in that it is only directed at commercial 
agencies and does not deal with any altruistic, charitable 
or family arrangements. 
Section 1 contains an extensive definition of 
surrogate mother as a woman who carries a child in pursuance 
of an arrangement made before she began to carry the child 
with a view to the child being handed over to another 
person. Regard is to be had to all the circumstances, 
including the-payment of money or money's worth, in deciding 
if the arrangement was made with such a view. However, the 
payment of money by the infertile couple to or for the 
benefit of the surrogate is not illegal under section 2(2) 
and (3). It is therefore inaccurate to state that the Act 
prohibits commercial surrogacy. By allowing the payment to 
the surrogate without any safeguards the Act fails to 
protect either party from exploitation. 
Section 2(1) prohibits certain activities if done on a 
commercial base, including taking part in any negotiations 
for a surrogacy arrangement. A person does an act on a 
commercial basis if he does it with a view to payment being 
received by himself or another. A solicitor may commit an 
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offence if his act could be construed as taking part in the 
negotiations or offering to negotiate or even compiling any 
information with a view to its use in the negotiation. 
However, the surrogate herself is exempted from the 
provisions of section 2(1) and so is a person who 
commissions a surrogate to carry a foetus for him - Section 
2(2)(b). Presumably the use of the male pronoun indicates 
that it refers to the husband of the infertile couple. 
Section 2(5) and (7) also prohibit commercial 
activities of a body of persons. Whereas an individual is 
guilty of an offence if he does an act on a commercial basis 
and payment is received or contemplated in respect of that 
• - act, a body of persons is guilty of an offence if 
negotiating the making of surrogacy arrangements is one of 
its activities and payment is made to it whether or not the 
payment is connected to that activity. •This may be 
important in the case of a charitable body which receives a 
donation after assisting the parties. 
Section 2(4), (6), and (9) provide defences and a 
person may have a defence if it can be established that the 
payment was not made in respect of the surrogacy arrangement. 
Section 3(1) makes it an offence to publish or 
distribute any advertisement offering to act as a surrogate 
or searching for a surrogate. The prohibition is exhaustive 
and covers all forms of advertising. A distinction is made 
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between those who publish - section 3(2) and (4), and those 
who distribute a prohibited advertisement - section 3(3) and 
(5). A person who publishes a prohibited advertisement is 
guilty irrespective of his state of knowledge, whereas a 
person who distributes a prohibited advertisement is guilty 
only if he knew the advertisement contained any indication 
relating to surrogacy. 
Penalties for contraventions against the Act are a fine 
not exceeding $2,000 with the additional sentence of up to 3 
months' imprisonment for an offence against section 2. 
The major weaknesses of the Act are that it allows 
surrogacy but does not provide any framework for its 
regulation and that it ignores the issues of the status of 
the child and parenthood. To point to other legislation 
which deals with these issues in other contexts, is to 
ignore the problems that arise by applying legislation aimed 
at a particular set of circumstances to circumstances of a 
different nature. At present, a child born as a result of a 
surrogacy agreement is not deemed by law to be the child of 
the intended parents, the infertile couple. The child may 
be well looked after by his intended parents, but no legal 
status is attached to the relationship and the child remains 
a ward of the court. The presumptions of parenthood under 
the existing legislation work to the detriment of the 
intended parents and the child. 
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The majority of the Warnock Committee recommended that 
all surrogacy arrangements be made illegal and unenforceable 
- yet section 1(9) of the Act states that the Act applies to 
surrogacy arrangements whether or not they are lawful or 
unforceable. Thus, the legislation does not address itself 
to the legality or otherwise of surrogacy arrangements. 
This may be interpreted as inferring that some surrogacy 
arrangements may be enforceable. Matters relating to the 
custody and upbringing of a child is governed by section 1 
of the Guardianship of Minors Act 1973 (U.K.) and, therefore, 
the terms of a surrogacy agreement would not prevail over 
the child's best interests. A term requiring the surrogate 
to hand over the child would not therefore be enforceable. 
The Minister for Health, Mr. Kenneth Clarke, resisted 
attempts to amend section 1(9) as, in his opinion, a 
surrogate should be permitted to rely on the agreement in 
some instances. 78 One such case would be that a surrogate 
who stopped work in reliance on a promise to reimburse her 
for loss of earnings should be able to recover for that 
loss. The problem with this approach, as one writer has 
suggested, 78 is to decide which terms are valid and on what 
basis should they be so decided. 
By limiting the Act to commercial agencies only, the 
Act leaves the door open for non-profit organizations to 
• make surrogacy arrangements without attracting criminal 
liabilities, provided the use of any kind of advertisement, 
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prohibited under section 3, is not resorted to. By 
prohibiting the use of any kind of advertising, it would be 
• very difficult for a couple to seek an unknown person as a 
surrogate and for a woman unknown to the couple to offer her 
willingness to act as a surrogate. Only by word of mouth, 
or through family or friends is the possibility left open 
for some arrangements to be made. In such circumstances, 
family arrangements may well be the only way for infertile 
couples to achieve their desire to have a child who is 
biologically connected to one of them. 
In order to rectify some of the ambiguities of the Act, 
the Surrogacy Arrangements (Amendment) Act 1986 (U.K.) removes 
the immunity from prosecution of the surrogate and any 
person commissioning her. It also extends the Act to cover 
non-commercial surrogacy agencies. Finally, it makes it an 
offence to assist or take part in the establishment of a 
pregnancy knowing that it is in pursuance of a surrogacy agreement. 
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Ontario, Canada 
In contrast to the Warnock and Waller Reports, the 
Report of the Ontario Law Reform Commission 80 concluded 
that modern law must reflect the benefits of the new 
technologies and the hopes of infertile men and women while 
guarding against those excesses •seen as harmful to society 
in general. The Commission based its recommendations on 
the premise of what is in the best interest of the resultant 
child. 
The Commission recognized that the ethical, social, 
moral and legal issues of the problem had to be faced. 
Instead of adopting one overall approach to artificial 
reproduction in general, the Commission proposed a 
functional and pragmatic approach formulating particular 
responses to particular problems. 
In regard to surrogacy, the Commission was of the view 
that as a matter of public policy, surrogacy should be 
permitted. It also recognized the fact that if prohibited, 
surrogacy would not disappear, but would continue 
unregulated. The Commission recommended that surrogacy 
agreements be enforceable provided they are supervised, and 
approved by the courts. The suitability of participants and 
the terms of the agreement would be subject to the scrutiny 
of a judge. 	The agreement would provide for certain 
eventualities such as abortion and death of an intended 
parent. The resultant child would be the legal child of the 
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infertile couple who contracted with the surrogate. 
The dissenting member of the Commission, Vide-Chairman 
Allan Leal, based his criticism against surrogacy on the 
grounds that the procreation and rearing of children should 
be within the marital union and that surrogacy was an 
exploitative arrangement. It cannot be said today that the 
long-life partnership of marriage is the prevailing standard 
pattern. From a point of view of sexual roles in society, 
marriage is often seen as the relationship in which a woman 
is exploited by her husband and society's male-dominated 
views of her place in the marriage. Although the 
possibility of exploitation of women in surrogacy 
arrangement does exist, under a system of regulation and 
supervision, that possibility is greatly reduced. The 
opinion has been expressed more than once that the outcry of 
moral indignation against surrogacy would not be heard if 
men were the ones bearing a child - the freedom men have to 
control their sexual lives should extend to women, 
especially in decisions affecting their sexual roles. 81 
If the proposals put forward by the Ontario Law Reform 
Commission were to be accepted in all jurisdictions the 
cause of equality would be enhanced. Women should be free 
to make their own decisions in the areas of procreation, and 
defining their sexual roles and responsibilities. The 
traditional views of motherhood are those formulated by men 
and perpetuated in law by judges nearly all of whom are 
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male. Support of surrogacy should be based on equality. 82 
The importance of the Report lies in its thoughtful approach 
and analysis of all the issues involved in human artificial 
reproduction, including the practice of surrogacy. The 
Commission realised that the moral, social and psychological 
issues had to be faced. In the view of the Commission, the best 
interests of the child formed the basis of its recommendations. 
It therefore advocated a system which permitted private 
agreements but which protected the interests of all parties by 
subjecting the agreements to the scrutiny and supervision of the 
court. By recognizing that there exists a genuine demand for 
artificial means of alleviating the childlessness of infertile 
couples, the Commission accepted the fact that new technologies 
and procedures were available and should be used to the benefit 
of these infertile couples. This attitude is in stark contrast 
to views stated in. other Reports. 
United States 
In the United States, no formal reports of any 
Committees have been issued but a few States have proceeded 
to draft legislation in the area of surrogacy, but with 
varying results. 
In Michigan, a Bill was introduced to regulate the 
practice of surrogacy which includes criteria for 
suitability of infertile couples and terms of the 
83 contract. 	The biological father and his wife are deemed 
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to be the legal parents of the resultant child provided the 
wife acknowledged that her husband was the biological 
father. Presumably, the situation where a donor is used for 
insemination of surrogate is not contemplated by the Bill. 
It only alleviates the position of a fertile husband who has 
an infertile wife and not the infertile husband. 
84 The Kansas legislation 	validates a surrogacy 
agreement if written consents of all parties (including the 
husband of the surrogate) were obtained and certain 
requirements as to the terms of the contract were met. 
The resultant child is presumed to be the child of the 
infertile couple, thus making adoption unnecessary. Where 
the surrogate refuses to hand over the child, the child is 
deemed to be the child of the surrogate and the husband of 
the infertile couple (again presuming that he has donated 
the semen). The Bill does not adequately define the status 
and responsibilities of each party if any breach of the term 
of the contract were to occur. This is unsatisfactory as 
far as the child is concerned. 
The South Carolina Bill 85 relies on the adoption 
procedure to establish parenthood. At birth the child is 
presumed to be the child of the surrogate and her husband, 
until an adoption order under the Bill is made in favour of 
the infertile couple. This overcomes the problem prescribed 
by the adoption statute forbidding payment. This approach 
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ensures that the child has a legal status at all times and 
parental responsibilities are always in one parental couple 
or other. Unlike the case in Kansas, the supervision of the 
court goes beyond the formation of the contract by 
continuing through the pregnancy until the adoption 
procedure is finished. 
The most recent Californian Bill 86 is a bold attempt 
to end the confusion surrounding surrogacy agreements and 
deals with many situations overlooked by earlier 
legislation. Where the surrogate has donated the ovum and 
is the genetic mother, the procedure for adoption is 
incorporated into the Bill and is one of the prescribed 
terms of the surrogacy agreement. The surrogate is required 
to relinquish all parental rights to and the custody of the 
child, and the intended parents are obliged to take custody 
of and parental responsibility for the child, immediately 
after the birth, regardless of whether the child suffers 
from any physical or mental disease. 
The Kansas, Michigan, South Carolina, and California 
Bills all specifically permit the payment of a fee and from 
differing viewpoints. As the child is deemed to be the 
legitimate of the infertile couple, the payment of a fee in 
Kansas is not viewed as payment for the purchase of a child. 
Such payment may be decided by the terms of the agreement. 
The South Carolina Bill permits payment as compensation for 
the loss of income, the additional duties involved in 
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ichildbearing and the restrictions on normal activities 
i during pregnancy. However the amount of such compensation 
is to be strictly controlled by the court. The California 
cBill also allows payment to the surrogate as compensation 
for her services. In Michigan, payments may be made in 
: respect of reasonable,medical, legal, and living expenses, 
and for loss of work time. However, no discounting is 
, allowed for stillbirth or a defective child. 
Most of the Bills contemplate the use of the services 
of a surrogate by single individuals. The Kansas Bill 
' implies that the procedure is only available to married 
heterosexual couples, and that the surrogate mother herself 
be married by the use of the terms sperm donor and his wife 
and surrogate mother and her husband. The Californian Bill 
enables couples, whether married or not, and single persons 
. of either sex, to enter into a surrogacy agreement. 
The South Carolina Bill limits it to married couples by 
reference to the natural . father and his wife. 
Conclusion 
Most of the Reports of the Committees recommended that 
surrogacy agreements should be null, void, illegal and 
unenforceable. 87 Only the Chalmers Committee in Tasmania 
88 in its Report 	advocated that surrogacy arrangements 
should not be prohibited on the ground that in some 
! instances such arrangements should be permitted. The Demack 
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Committee in its Report 89 agreed with the Report of the 
Chalmers Committee90 that no criminal liability should be 
attached to participating in surrogacy arrangements. 
However, the Reports of the Waller Committee 91 and the 
Report of the Warnock Committee92 recommended criminal 
sanctions regarding advertising and payments made in respect 
of surrogacy arrangements. These recommendations have now 
been incorporated into legislation in Victoria 93- and the 
United Kingdom. 94 
The desirability of legislation which prohibits and 
criminalizes the practice of surrogacy is to be doubted, 
given an infertile couple's obvious desperate need to have a 
child biologically related to at least one of them. So long 
as infertile couples are unable to obtain a child by other 
means, the law will continue to be broken. When law is 
contravened, the legal status of the children born as a 
result of surrogacy arrangements will be in limbo or it will 
be decided under existing law which is not designed to cater 
for such situations. This will result in many difficult 
cases being decided under entirely inappropriate rules. 
• To suggest, as the Asche Committee did in its 
95 Report, 	that legislation which prohibits the practice of 
surrogacy would prevent the practice from occurring is to 
ignore past experience in the area of abortion. When 
abortion was made a criminal offence, it continued to 
flourish as it met a desperate need. It continued, unabated 
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and unregulated, often performed by non-medically trained 
persons, causing ill-health, and in some cases, death of 
women. 
It is premature to criminalize surrogacy which, if 
adequately regulated, may provide a successful means of 
alleviating infertility. The problems associated with the 
refusal of a surrogate to hand over the child or the refusal 
of an infertile couple to accept a deformed baby are capable 
of being solved. 
A preferable approach is to permit surrogacy in certain 
well-defined circumstances subject to regulation andthe 
control of the courts or an appropriate government body. 
The enlightened approach of the Ontario Law Reform 
Commission and some States in the United States has much to 
recommend it. In the States of Alaska and Rhode Island 
legislation has been enacted specifying that surrogacy 
contracts are legal and enforceable. 96 The Californian Bill 
provides for the judicial enforcement of surrogacy contracts 
which the Bill declares "are not per se against sound public 
and social policy".97 
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CHAPTER 4 
SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS 
Public Policy 
The term public policy is difficult to define but it 
can be said that conduct against public policy is conduct 
that is "injurious to and against the public good". 98 
As the Demack Report pointed out, 99 there is 
"disagreement in society on what might be regarded as the 
most basic issues of public concern. Certainly, there is 
little consensus on the matter when applied in the area of 
reproductive procedures. On the one hand, there is the 
opinion that the expectation of human happiness justifies 
the application of any new reproductive technology or 
procedure, and on the other, is the opinion that to allow 
any technical or third party intrusion into the marital 
relationship was to violate the traditional notions of the 
sanctity of marriage. The separation of procreation from 
the marital relationship is seen by many as a dehumanizing 
factor which threatens the existence of the marriage and the 
family while also weakening the biological links in the 
family. However, the purpose of reproductive techniques and 
procedures is not 'to replace normal procreation methods but 
to enable a couple to have a child which otherwise they 
would be unable to have. 
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The notion that an agreement by a parent to transfer 
parental rights and liabilities in respect of a child is 
unenforceable as being against public policy appears to be 
based on the maxim eX turpi causa non oritur actio - an action 
does not arise from an illegal cause. It is clear from 
Godblot v Fittockl" that the maxim is only one element of 
the wider concept of public policy. In the law of contract, 
the maxim signifies that a contract which is entered into 
for an illegal purpose will not be enforced by the courts. 101 
Before a court acts on this principle, due 
consideration ought to be given to the extent to which 
public harm may occur and the nature of the moral quality of 
the conduct in the light of community standards. As times 
change, public policy relevant to a particular issue also 
changes. As it is a very elastic notion, public policy will 
also depend on the particular judge's view of whether a 
particular agreement conflicts with the concept of public 
morality or decency. The consequences at law of entering 
into a contract apparently against public policy should vary 
in severity according to the degree of impropriety on the 
part of the parties. 1 ° 2 A contract which is prejudicial to 
the status of marriage is commonly referred to as void. A 
surrogacy contract, seen in this context, may be viewed as 
void so far as it offends against public policy. 
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Terms of Surrogacy Agreements 
In arriving at a conclusion whether a surrogacy 
agreement is unenforceable as against public policy, it is 
useful to examine the type of provisions normally found in 
such agreements as formulated in the United States. It is 
there that the practice of regulating surrogacy arrangements 
within the framework of contract principles began. Noel 
Keane, a lawyer in the State of Michigan, arranges contracts 
between infertile couples and surrogates. 
A typical contract would provide for the husband of an 
infertile woman to agree to the following:- 103 
1 - to have his sperm used for the artificial 
insemination of the intended surrogate. 
to accept the fact that he is the natural father 
of any child or children born from such 
insemination and take custody of such a child or 
such children. 
3 - to pay for all medical expenses for the period 
from insemination till 6 weeks after the birth of 
the child, relating to the pregnancy, childbirth, 
paternity testing, travel expenses, life insurance. 
A deposit is paid by the natural father and the 
full amount is paid over to the surrogate mother 
after his paternity has been proven. 
p. 	
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4 - to accept all the children born in a multiple 
birth. 
5 - to assume legal responsibility of an abnormal 
child. 
The intended surrogate for her part agrees to the 
following:- 
to be artificially inseminated with the sperm of 
the husband of the infertile couple. 
2 - to abstain from sexual intercourse 2 weeks before 
being artificially inseminated. 
3 - to carry a child resulting from such insemination 
to term. 
to undergo such medical testings and examinations 
as may be necessary for her health or for the 
health of the child. 
5 - to waiver 'rights to abort the child except on 
medical grounds. 
6 - to abstain from drinking alcohol, taking 
unprescribed drugs and smoking. 
7 - to surrender all parental rights over the child. 
- to deliver the child into the custody of the 
infertile couple after birth. 
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9 - •to return any money already paid if paternity 
tests show the sperm donor is not the father of 
the child. 
The husband is required to give his consent to the 
artificial insemination of his wife to rebut the presumption 
that the child is a child of their marriage, and promises to 
make no claim to the child. The wife of the sperm donor on 
her part agrees to adopt the child. 
One of the main reasons that a surrogacy agreement is 
regarded as being unenforceable is the principle that the 
rights and duties of a parent are not property rights and 
therefore cannot be assigned to others. 1°4 This approach 
overlooks the fact that the rights and duties of one parent 
- the surrogate -are transferred to the other parent - the 
natural father and not to a stranger. Under AID 
legislation, a husband who consents •to the artificial 
insemination of his wife is deemed to be the father of the 
105 resultant child. 	Therefore, in a surrogacy arrangement, a 
child who is born as a result of artificial insemination and 
with consent of the husband of the surrogate mother is the 
legal child of her husband. There arises a complex 
situation unintended by the legislation whereby the natural 
mother and legal father of a child wish to transfer parental 
rights and obligations to the natural father of the child 
who it has always been intended should be the father in fact 
and who will raise the child. Such intentions are not 
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detrimental to the welfare of the child and therefore should 
not fall within the ambit of the principle of the 
inalienability of parental rights and duties. Where the 
wife has contributed the ovum and is the genetic mother, the 
agreement may be seen as payment for the use of a womb 
rather than payment to buy a child. 
In the State of Kentucky, the Attorney-General issued 
an opinion106that surrogacy agreements are illegal and 
unenforceable as they amounted to baby sellingp and 
contravened State Statutes which allowed applications to 
terminae parental rights only if they were made 5 days or 
later after the birth of the child. However, an agreement 
which provides for the parental rights to be terminated at 
the earliest legal opportunity would not breach such 
statutes. The Attorney-General of the State of Oklahoma 
also expressed an opinior 197 that surrogacy agreements are 
unenforceable on the ground that they violated Statutes 
which prohibited trafficking in children. 
Breaches of Surrogacy Agreements 
Even if it is accepted that a surrogacy agreement is 
enforceable on the ground that such an agreement would not 
offend against the principle of public policy, a plethora of 
legal and ethical problems arise where a breach of any of 
the provisions in the agreement occurs. 
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Although surrogacy agreements may be carefully drawn up. 
to prevent the participants from changing their minds and to 
,anticipate the many complex situations which may arise, it 
may not be possible to establish the means by which any 
breaches of the terms, of the agreement may be settled by the 
court. Any term of the agreement which the court finds to 
be contrary to public policy may be struck down. 
An examination of the breaches which may occur and the 
remedies available will demonstrate the difficulties the 
parties to surrogate motherhood arrangements will have to 
face. 
1. Abortion - Where the surrogate wishes to abort the 
foetus, it is unclear if she can be legally prevented from 
so doing by the genetic father of the foetus. 
In the United States, abortion raises the issue of a 
constitutional right to privacy which has usually been 
considered in te rms of a State's right to regulate. The 
U.S. Supreme Court in Carey v Population Services  
1.08 International 	in overturning a state statute prohibiting 
the distribution of contraceptions to minors analyzed the 
right to privacy as being one aspect of the 'liberty' 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.109 The Court recognized that, while the outer 
limits of the right of privacy had not been marked by the 
Court, the right of an individual to make certain important 
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personal decisions without unjustified government 
interference was clear. The decision whether or not to 
beget or bear a child is one of the protected choices. 
In Roe v Wade  ,110  the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the 
argument of a woman's absolute right to terminate her 
pregnancy at any time. However, the Court held that a woman 
had the right, in consultation with her physician, to 
terminate her pregnancy in the first trimester, based on the 
fundamental right to privacy. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
also held that this right to abortion is a right which does 
not depend on the consent of her husband. 111 In the United 
Kingdom, a husband's consent to his wife's abortion is 
similarly not required. 112 
In Australia, in the case of the Attorney-General of  
Queensland (Ex. rel. Kerr) and another v T, 113 the Supreme 
Court of Queensland rejected a natural father's application 
for an injunction to prevent the unmarried mother of his 
child from aborting the child, even though such an abortion 
might be a breach of the criminal law. The court held that 
it would not be a proper exercise of discretion to grant the 
injunction on the assumption that the woman proposed to 
commit a crime as the determination of that issue is for the 
jury. To act on such an assumption would be to overstep the 
limits to which the law should intrude upon personal liberty 
and privacy in the pursuit of moral and religious aims. 
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If a woman's husband cannot veto his wife's decision to 
abort, it is unclear whether in a surrogacy agreement the 
infertile couple, who only have a contractual relationship 
with the surrogate, have a right to stop such an abortion, 
even where the agreement specifically prohibits such an 
action on the part of the surrogate. Certainly, if the 
surrogate does abort, she is in breach of a term which is 
the very essence of the agreement. The usual remedy 
available in contract is an action for damages and in a 
surrogacy agreement the infertile couple may recover any 
expenses already paid. While these damages for monetary 
harm may compensate for any financial loss, they do not take 
into account any emotional harm suffered by the infertile 
couple in losing the child. 
2. Proper self care - Where the surrogate is in breach 
of any term of the agreement which prohibits smoking, 
drinking, and taking medication without medical consent, and 
that breach results in a miscarriage or a defective child, 
many emotional issues are raised. The expectations of the 
infertile couple of having a child, or having a healthy 
childphave been impaired. The couple may have an action for 
damages for breach of terms of the contract or sue in tort 
in negligence. 
In an action for negligence, the infertile couple must 
prove that the surrogate owed them a duty to maintain an 
adequate level of care during her pregnancy. If the 
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surrogacy agreement contains explicit provisions regarding 
this level of care, the extent of her duty is clear. If the 
agreement does not specify the level of care, the standard 
of care must be the same that a reasonable pregnant woman in 
the circumstances would undertake. The law regards the 
concept of reasonableness as flexible to be applied 
according to the circumstances in each case. 
The liability of duty of care is not merely a duty not 
to act carelessly, but is "a legal duty not to be careless 
114 Not every bit of carelessness is 
actionable. "There has to be a breach of a duty which the 
law recognizes 	115 Since the "categories of 
negligence are never closed",116 it is always open for 
Parliament or the courts to expand the existing areas of 
liability by creating-new situations of duty of care. 
Although a surrogate, in maintaining proper self care, 
protects the welfare of the unborn child, the duty of care 
may be owed to the infertile couple as the intended parents 
of the child who may suffer nervous shock. The test of 
liability for shock "is foreseeability of injury by shock". 117 
If the infertile couple establish that a duty of care is 
owed them by the surrogate and that a breach of this duty 
has occurred, they must then prove that the breach caused 
damage in order to succeed. "Causation must, primarily, be 
a question of fact 	118 The courts appear to isolate 
those factors but for which the damage would not have been 
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sustained from what appears to be the most responsible 
cause. In the case of a defective child, it may be 
difficult to trace the origin or cause of some congenital 
defects. Although it is generally accepted that alcohol 
consumption may cause birth defects, it may not be possible 
to prove that a specific birth defect is the result from 
such consumption. 
A surrogacy agreement may contain a provision for 
specified damages in the event of a breach. Where such a 
specified sum is a genuine pre-estimate of the loss that 
will be suffered because of the breach, the infertile couple 
would be entitled to recover their liquidated damages where 
a breach occurs without having to prove any actual damage. 
Liquidated damages have been defined as ". . the sum which the 
parties have by the contract assessed as the damages to be 
paid, whatever may be the actual damage.". 119 
However, if the specified sum does not bear a 
reasonable relationship to the expected damages the court 
will interpret the provision as a penalty provision and will 
not enforce it. "The destination between penalties and 
liquidated damages depends on the intention of the parties 
to be gathered from the whole of the contract.". 120 
Where payment of money damages will be inadequate, 
either because the harm is not clearly quantifiable or 
because money cannot adequately compensate for the damage 
suffered, equitable relief may be available. 
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The grant of a mandatory injunction is issued at the 
discretion of the court. The court will only grant an injunction 
where the plaintiff shows a very strong probability that grave 
damage will accrue to him if the injunction is refused or that 
damages, if rewarded, would not be a sufficient remedy. 121 
• If a surrogate fails to obtain an appropriate level of 
medical attention, the infertile couple should have little 
difficulty in showing that damages would be inadequate in such 
circumstances. For the infertile couple to be entitled to an 
injunction, it is not necessary to prove that the damage caused 
is substantial .122 However, a mandatory injunction, compelling 
the surrogate to undertake certain activities in order to 
maintain proper self care may not be granted if it demands close 
personal supervision by the court. Equitable relief by way of 
specific performance will not be available if there is an 
adequate remedy in law,123 or where damages does not afford 
adequate relief. The principle "has always been that equity will 
only grant specific performance if, under all the circumstances, 
124 it is just and equitable so to do." 	The subject matter of a 
surrogacy agreement is certainly unique and it is doubtful that 
damages are either adequate or appropriate in the circumstances. 
However, a contract for personal services is not specifically 
enforceable,125 and the surrogacy arrangement may be viewed as an 
agreement for personal services. This is important if the 
infertile couple were to seek relief by way of a mandatory 
injunction as the courts have refused the issue of an injunction 
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if it, in effect results in the specific enforcement of a 
contract which is not otherwise specifically enforceable. 126 
It appears, therefore, that although the equitable relief of 
'mandatory injunction or specific performance is more desirable 
from the infertile couple's point of view, the courts may be 
reluctant to grant such relief. On the other hand, the remedy of 
damages may be inadequate and in any case difficult to quantify. 
It is likely therefore that the term of a surrogacy agreement to 
obtain adequate medical care and attain a proper level of self 
care may be unenforceable. 
3. Handicapped child - Where an infertile couple 
refuses to accept a handicapped child born as a result of a 
surrogacy agreement, it may be difficult to determine an 
appropriate remedy. Specific performance is unlikely since 
a court would not force the couple to take custody of an 
unwanted child as this would not be in the interests of the 
child. 
The husband should not be able to deny responsibility 
for the child as not only is he the genetic father of the 
child but has also contracted to accept the child. The 
surrogate may be able to claim damages from the infertile 
couple to cover the cost of rearing the child she had not 
expected to keep. 
However, the surrogate is debarred from claiming 
damages for the breach if she fails to take all reasonable 
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steps to mitigate the loss caused by the breach. However, 
the only way the surrogate may mitigate against loss she 
would suffer in incurring the expenses of bringing up the 
child would be to put the child up for adoption. Where the 
surrogate does not wish to do so, it is unlikely that a 
court would force adoption as that may be contrary to the 
welfare of the child. 
In Australia, the court may also make maintenance 
orders against the father of the child under the various 
maintainance acts. 127 
Where none of the parties to the agreement is willing 
to accept the child, the surrogate should be able to offer 
the child for adoption. 
Genetic, physical, and psychological screening of all 
parties to a proposed surrogacy agreement should help to 
minimize the possibility of an infertile couple who are 
unwilling to accept a defective child entering into such an 
agreement. A genetic evaluation of the proposed surrogate 
would help to prevent the possibility of the birth of a 
child with a genetic deficiency. Prenatal testing may also 
discover abnormalities in the foetus. However, the question 
then arises whether the infertile couple may then require an 
abortion to be performed. 
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The Surrogate Parenting Associates128 defined certain 
. ,--factors which were to be taken into account by that 
organization in the screening of potential surrogate 
mothers.129 She had to be a married woman of good health 
with no transmutable genetic disorder Who had already given 
birth to at least one healthy child. 
Any physician who assists in a surrogacy agreement by 
carrying out the screening procedures should also provide 
counselling to all the parties. If a physician fails to 
properly carry out screening procedures as a result of which 
a handicapped child is born, it is questionable whether any 
of the parties may sue the physician for negligence or 
malpractice. It may be difficult to prove that a particular 
action or lack of action on the part of the physician caused 
the handicap. If this causal connection is established, the 
physician may be liable in negligence as he owes a 
professional duty of care to the infertile couple and the 
surrogate to detect possible genetic defects. The failure 
to do so prior to insemination will result in the birth of a 
child who may inherit the genetic abnormality. The 
failure to do so during early pregnancy may debar the 
parties from the option of an abortion. 
However, the measure of damages in such a case would 
be almost impossible to quantify. The court cannot be 
expected to calculate a sum of money when faced with the 
task of comparing the value of life to the value of never 
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having been born or having been born handicapped. 
It should be remembered that the seemingly callous 
approach of the infertile couple in refusing to accept a 
handicapped child is not unique to situations involving 
surrogacy agreements. The same reactions occur where a 
handicapped child is born to a fertile couple. A surrogacy 
agreement should not be viewed as undesirable solely on the 
ground that in some cases a handicapped child may be 
rejected by his intended parents. This argument in some 
respects resembles the issues involved in comparing the 
benefit of not being born at all with the value of a life, 
albeit an impaired life. 
As is the case in ordinary family situations, the 
handicapped child may be cared for by foster parents, in an 
institution or perhaps even put up for adoption. The welfare of 
the child concerned will dictate his future. 
4. Disputed paternity - Another situation in which an 
infertile couple may reject a child apparently born as a 
result of a surrogacy agreement iswhere the child is not the 
genetic child of the intended father. A provision for 
compulsory blood tests and other paternity tests after birth 
of the child should be part of the agreement to establish 
the child is in fact the child of the intended father. 
Proof that a child is not the biological child of the 
intended father is usually the result of the surrogate 
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mother breaching a term of the contract to abstain from 
sexual intercourse with any man within a specified period 
prior and after insemination with the intended father's 
sperm. There has been one case of disputed paternity in the 
U.S.A. on this issue.130 M, the intended father, refused to 
accept a child born to S with whom he had contracted to 
provide a child and who had been artifically inseminated 
with his sperm. The child was born with a disorder which 
showed mental retardation. Blood and genetic tests 
confirmed that M was not the father of the child, but that 
the child was the child of S and her husband. M sued S for 
not producing the child he had contracted for, S sued the 
physician, lawyer, and psychiatrist involved in the 
surrogate motherhood programme for not advising her about 
the timing of sexual intercourse with her husband. The 
surrogacy agreement included a provision that S abstain from 
sexual intercourse until pregnant as a result of being 
inseminated with the sperm of M. S also sued M for 
violating her privacy by making the matter public (the 
results of the paternity tests, which showed that M was not 
the father of the child, were announced on a well-known 
television programme). S also claimed that the child's 
illness had not been passed on by his genetic parents but by 
a virus transmitted by the sperm of M. 
The end result was that S and her husband accepted the 
child into their family but the case serves as an example of 
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what can go amiss when the terms of a contract and their 
: implications are not fully understood by the parties. 
Another dispute of paternity was raised in a recent 
case when a surrogate refused to hand over her child to an 
infertile couple, Mr. & Mrs. S., after agreeing to a 
131 surrogacy arrangement. 	The surrogate, Mrs. W. claimed 
that she had sexual intercourse with her husband around the 
same time that she was artificially inseminated with the 
sperm of Mr. S. and alleged that her husband might be the 
child's father, despite having had a vasectomy. Superior 
Court Judge Harvey Sorkow (New Jersey) ruled that temporary 
custody of the child be given to Mr. & Mrs. S. until the 
validity of the surrogacy agreement is decided. 
5. Failure to pay agreed sum - The surrogate should be 
able to recover expenses and costs agreed to if they are 
delineated in the agreement, and if they are not, they may 
be ascertained by assessing the actual expenses and costs 
incurred. 
If the surrogate is a single woman, it is possible that 
she may claim maintenance for herself and her child. 132 
If she is married, it is doubtful that she can make any 
financial claim in respect of the child against the sperm 
donor as natural father as under artificial insemination 
legislation133 it is her husband who is treated in law as the 
father of the child. If the agreement stipulates a sum of 
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money which is in excess of a reasonable amount for actual 
expenses, it may be viewed by the court as payment with a 
view to the adoption of the child. As will be discussed 
later,134  such a payment is prohibited under the various 
adoption laws. 
6. Divorce or death of infertile couple - The effect 
of this doctrine of frustration is to "bring the contract to 
an end forthwith, without more and automatically".135 If the 
intended parents were both to die before the birth of the 
child, their promise to accept and adopt the child cannot be 
fulfilled. The contract is void for impossibility of 
performance. This doctrine of frustration is one which is 
merely used as a possible defence to an action for breach of 
contract due to non-performance of part or all of a 
contract. In a surrogacy situation, it may provide a 
defence to the estate of the couple against a claim by the 
surrogate for the specified sum. The general rule that a 
party to a contract is strictly liable to perform a 
promise136  was mitigated by the case of Taylor v Caldwell 137 
which held that where the fulfilment of a contract is 
frustrated by extraneous factors for which neither party is 
responsible, the liabilities of the parties are discharged. 
What will or will not amount to frustration depends on the 
facts of each case. The courts will determine the case on 
the basis.of•what is fair and just.138 
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In a contract for personal services, the courts 
generally assume that the parties intended that the contract 
will not be binding on either if performance is prevented or 
made impossible by the death of either party. 139 On this 
basis, it is most likely that a claim by the surrogate for 
unpaid money due will fail against the defence of the 
doctrine of frustration in the event of the death of the 
couple. If only one of the couple were to die, this defence 
would be weakened by the fact that the surviving partner may 
be well capable of accepting the child. 
If the impossibility or frustration of the contract is 
self-induced by one party, as in a divorce, that party 
cannot rely on the doctrine of frustration to discharge him 
from his obligation. 140 In a situation where the intended 
parents are divorced before the birth of the child, it may 
be argued that there is no longer a couple to whom the child 
is to be handed over. The surrogate may be excused from 
handing over the child and may be entitled to claim costs 
already incurred but not yet paid. However, neither party 
is entitled to recover any money already paid. 141 
7. Relinquishment of Child - If the surrogate refuses 
to hand over the child and the infertile couple suffer 
distress, monetary damages are inadequate to compensate for 
the loss of a child and are not usually recoverable in 
contract actions. In the United States, the accepted view 
is that the law does not impose a general duty of care to 
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avoid causing mental distress .142  However, an action for 
breach of contract on the basis of intention to inflict 
mental or emotional distress may be available. 143 However, 
such an action is not a viable proposition, as the surrogate 
is not likely to have sufficient funds to meet any damages 
awarded. An action for specific performance is an 
alternative remedy. However, in such a case, the court must 
determine whether removal of the child from the surrogate 
will be in the best interests of the child. It is clear 
from A v C144 that these matters are decided with reference 
to the welfare of the child. The court is unlikely to be 
biased in favour of the natural father by virtue only of a 
provision in the contract. 
From the surrogate's point of view, if she refuses to 
hand over the child as agreed, she may well succeed in 
action for child support against the natural father where 
the court decides she has a right to keep the child. 
However, it has been argued that it is best for all 
concerned to have the child in a stable financial 
environment with its natural father and his wife rather than 
in an impoverished environment with only one parent to raise 
it . 145 
The effect of relinquishing a child on a surrogate mother 
may be only partly compared to the effects of relinquishing 
a child for adoption. Research in the latter area has found 
the effects to be a long lasting sense of loss. 146 However, 
'relinquishing a child into the care of an infertile couple 
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according to a pre-arranged agreement does not inherently 
contain the same emotional elements as adoption following an 
unwanted or unplanned pregnancy. In a study carried out by 
Parker147 of women applying to act as surrogates, most of the 
women denied the importance of their biological contribution 
to the child. They minimized the anticipated feelings of 
loss and sadness by emphasizing the experiential 
contribution to the development of the child. 
Adoption laws and Financial Aspect of Surrogacy 'Arrangements 
In order for a surrogacy agreement to be illegal, it 
must violate conduct prohibited by law. In the absence of 
specific legislation on the issue, the courts have turned to 
the concept of public policy and existing law to resolve 
some of these concerns - in particular the laws prohibiting 
the sale and purchase of a child and the relinquishment of 
parental rights other than by adoption. 148 
Under the various adoption laws, it is a criminal 
offence to make a payment or be involved with any 
arrangements to make payment with a view to adopt a child 
without the approval of the court of the Director of 
We1fare.149 The purpose of such a provision is to prevent 
black market trafficking in babies. 
It has been argued that a provision prohibiting payment 
in connection with adoption, does not apply to a situation 
where one party to the arrangement is the natural father of 
the child. 50 Such a parent cannot be said to be purchasing 
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his own child and the procedure resembles custody rather 
than adoption.151  Where adoption of the child is not 
contemplated by the parties, any payment made to the 
surrogate could not be viewed as payment in connection with 
an adoption and therefore is not illegal. Where payment is 
not made to the surrogate, the issue of illegality does not 
arise and therefore adoption may proceed. It has also been 
argued152 that statutes forbidding payment in connection with 
adoption do not apply to surrogacy arrangements as they were 
not drafted to meet such situations but were designed to 
prohibit blackmarket baby selling. Furthermore, it has been 
153 argued that even if a surrogacy arrangement requires the 
adoption of the child and falls within the ambit of a 
prohibition on the payment of a fee in connection with that 
adoption, the arrangement does not violate the prohibition 
as the payment is not for a child, but for the services 
offered by the surrogate such as pregnancy and childbirth. 
The fact that these statutes do not purport to make it a 
crime to pay someone for becoming pregnant or having a baby 
confirms that surrogacy was never the target of the 
154 statutes. 
The prohibition on the payment or reward for or in 
consideration of an adoption, consent, and transfer of a 
155 child appears to be strengthened by the provision enabling 
a court to refuse to make an adoption order in reliance on a 
consent obtained by "fraud, duress or other improper 
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means".156 The financial gain offered by the infertile 
couple may be viewed as coercion or an improper means of 
obtaining consent to the adoption of the child. However, 
the offer of payment to do an arduous task is not in itself 
coercive. The surrogate is aware of what is involved in 
pregnancy and childbirth and makes an informed choice to 
participate. The payment is in consideration of the risks 
she undertakes. It is normal practice for a person to 
expect remuneration for services voluntarily rendered. 
Without payment, a person is unlikely to carry out such a 
serious undertaking. 
The aspect of commercialism leads to the notion that 
the child is treated as a consumer product. As Keane 
points out,157 it is difficult to understand why the 
commercial aspect of surrogacy is viewed as being 
inconsistent with public policy. A person usually satisfies 
his needs in a commercial way. A profit motive in a 
surrogacy arrangement should not mean that such an 
arrangement should be prohibited. It is more an argument 
for regulation. 
The question of whether the infertile couple are buying 
a child or the surrogate's personal services may not be the 
only question at issue. An additional question may be 
whether the couple are "buying" the right to rear a child by 
paying the mother to beget and bear one. 
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As well as the argument that surrogacy may involve 
exploitation of a surrogate, the necessity or desirability 
of payment of a fee may preclude the less well-off infertile 
couple from participating in such an agreement. This could 
be viewed as a means test on parental suitability. Only 
those couples who can afford to pay the fee for the services 
of a surrogate (in the vicinity of US $10,000) are able even 
to contemplate surrogacy as a way of alleviating their 
childlessness. Unless they are successful in the long 
adoption'queues,'they are destined to have their 
desire to be parents thwarted. 
Surrogacy may be likened to early adoption in that the 
surrogate has consented to relinquish her child to an 
infertile couple after its birth. The difference is that in 
a surrogacy agreement the surrogate makes this decision 
before becoming pregnant. This fact poses problems for the 
infertile couple if they wish to apply for adoption. 
Section 26 of the Adoption of Children Act 1968 (Tas.)158 
provides that a court will not rely on any consent given 
before the birth of a child, or within 7 days after the 
birth, unless the woman is medically fit. In addition, 
consent once given, may be revoked any time before 30 days 
after the consent was given or before the day an adoption 
order is made, whichever comes first (section 23). 
66. 
Even if a surrogacy agreement were to provide for 
consent to adoption to be given in accordance with these 
provisions, the infertile couple run the risk of the 
surrogate changing her mind. Once consent has been revoked, 
the only recourse the infertile couple may have is to 
persuade the court to dispense with her consent under 
section 27(1)(e) on the basis thit special circumstances 
exist and, under section 11, that the adoption is in the best 
interests of the child. 
Cases 
There has been conflicting authority on the issue of 
payment in surrogacy agreements. In the opinion of Keane, 159 
several decisions in the United States suggest that public 
policy objections may not necessarily be relevant in cases 
of payment made for adoptions where the adoptions are made 
in a family context. 
In re Estate of Shirk160  a mother agreed to the 
adoption of her child by the child's grandmother in exchange 
for the grandmother's promise to bequeath her estate to the 
mother and child. The executor of the will claimed that the 
agreement was void as against public policy as it 
constituted the barter of a child. 
The Kansas Supreme Court was of the opinion that a 
"contract of a parent by which he bargains away for his 
pecuniary gain the custody of the child to a stranger and 
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attempts to relieve himself from all parental obligations, 
placing the burden on another who assumes it, without 
natural affection or moral obligation, but only because of 
161 the bargain, is void as against public policy". 
The court distinguished the case from the usual public 
policy considerations because it involved a family compact and 
was not without natural affection or moral obligation. 
In a surrogacy situation, the agreement may be seen as 
a family compact since it involves the biological father and 
biological mother both of whom have parental obligations 
towards the child. 
Although a pecuniary motive may be important to the 
surrogate mother in entering the contract, the fact of 
pecuniary gain to the mother in Shirk's Case 162 did not 
deter the court from approving the agreement. The case, 
according to Keane,163 demonstrates that it is going too far 
to lay down a general rule that payment for consideration 
for adoption should always be adverse to the child's 
interest. In surrogacy arrangements, the rule should not 
apply where there is natural affection and moral obligation 
on the part of the adopting parent towards the child. 
Surrogacy agreements are agreements between parents, and 
objections to such agreements on the ground of "baby-buying" 
lose much of their argument in surrogacy situations. 
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The State of Michigan Court of Appeal in Doe v 
Kelleyi  64 held that the adoption laws, although not directly 
prohibiting surrogacy agreements, did preclude any payment 
in connection with the use of adoption procedures to alter 
the legal status of a child born as a result of such an 
agreement. In that case, a couple, who wished to pay an 
intended surrogate a $5,000 fee, sought a declatory judgment 
that Michigan Statutes, prohibiting payment in connection 
with adoption of a child or release of parental rights, were 
unconstitutional. The court rejected the claim that the 
Statutes violated the childless couple's right to privacy, as 
there existed compelling State interest in forbidding any 
financial arrangements involved in the creation of family 
relationships. Any change in policy would, in the opinion 
of the court, have to come from the legislature. The case 
165 was affirmed by the Michigan Court of Appeals 	which upheld 
the view that although the Statute did not prohibit 
surrogacy arrangements, they did preclude payment in 
conjunction with adoption. Both the Supreme Courts of the 
State of Michigan and the United States have refused to hear 
the case on appea1. 1 66 The logic of the case appears to be 
that surrogacy for a fee is a case of baby selling. As all 
baby selling is (should be) illegal, surrogacy for a fee is 
(should be) illegal. 
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However, the Statute involved did not address 
itself to a surrogacy situation but was aimed at preventing 
involuntary relinquishment of the natural mother's child 
because of financial duress. A surrogate voluntarily 
relinquishes her child and the agreement is entered into 
before the pregnancy thus negating any financial pressure 
brought about by the birth. 
In a case which involved an agreement similar to the 
one in Shirk's Case,167 a federal court held that it was not 
against public policy to enforce an agreement to permit the 
adoption of an illegitimate child by its father where the 
adoption was in the best interests of the child and 
pecuniary gain was not the motivating factor on the part of 
the mother. 8 
Another attempt to validate surrogate arrangements was 
169 made in Michigan in the case of Syrkowski v Appleyard 	by 
way of custody proceedings. The court rejected the attempt 
on the ground that the State's paternity Act provided for 
support of only those children who were born out of wedlock. 
The Attorney-General of the State of Michigan argued that as 
•the child was a child of the surrogate and her husband by 
virtue of the artificial insemination laws her husband was 
obliged to provide that support. Once again, the court did 
not rule on the validity of surrogacy agreements, stating 
•that it was a matter of policy for the State legislature to 
determine. 
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In Kentucky v Bersheer170 the court held that a 
surrogacy agreement did not fall within the prohibition on 
the sale of babies as the natural father cannot be 
characterized as either adopting or buying his own baby. 
• 	The use of this approach allows custody to be given to 
the biological father or allows the couple to adopt the 
child. In Tasmania, an adoption order may be made in favour 
of a husband and wife jointly where one of them is the 
natural parent of the child.171 
In the United Kingdom, there seems little likelihood of 
surrogacy agreements being upheld by the courts on the basis•
of a right to privacy in procreation, since there_is not a 
written Constitution. The'earliest case considered by 
English courts illustrates the attitude of the court towards 
an arrangement which on the face of it appears unsavoury. 
172 In the case ofAvC 	acouple sought the custody of the _ _
husband's child, born by artificial insemination to a girl 
as a result of an agreement which involved the payment to 
the girl of £500. Judge Comyns refused to enforce the 
agreement on the ground that it was a contract for the sale 
and purchase of a child and branded such a contract as 
"pernicious". The case does not resolve the question of the 
legality or validity of surrogacy agreements but clearly 
shows that the English courts will not grant specific 
performance in a case which involves such an agreement. The 
fact that the mother of the child was a* prostitute, and that 
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the father was not married to his wife at the time the 
agreement was made, may go some way to explain the judge's 
distaste of the case. However, it may be that at that time, 
the idea of surrogacy was so novel that no 'respectable' 
woman would have risked her reputation to enter into a 
surrogacy agreement. 
Despite the fact that the Surrogacy Arrangements Act  
1985 (U.K.) prohibited commercial surrogacy, a surrogacy 
agency was not prosecuted in relation to payments which were 
made to the surrogate on the ground of insufficient evidence 
that any law was broken.173 The surrogacy agency claimed 
that the surrogate was not paid for carrying a child but for 
keeping a diary of her pregnancy and taking part in a film 
on the subject. Therefore such a payment did not contravene 
subsections (5) and (6) of that Act which made it an offence 
for a body of persons to receive payment for negotiating or 
facilitating the making of arrangements. Any money received 
by the agency appeared to be made in connection with matters 
other than the negotiation of a surrogacy arrangement. 
The case which was the driving force behind the rapid 
introduction of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 (U.K.) 
was the case of Re A Baby.174 The mother of the baby was 
paid to be artificially inseminated by the sperm of the 
husband of an infertile wife. The husband and his wife paid 
the London agency of an American surrogate motherhood 
1
75 organisation the equivalent of A$19,600. The mother of 
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the baby left the baby in hospital and returned home less 
than 24 hours after giving birth. The local government 
council for the borough where the baby was born sought a 
court order to prevent the mother from handing over the baby 
for eight days and was granted a "place of safety" order 
preventing the child's removal from the hospital. The order 
meant that the natural father could only have his child if he 
applied to the court for her to be made a ward of the court 
in the hope he would be granted custody. In the High Court, 
Latey J. declared that care and control of the child be 
given to the father and his wife, an American professional 
couple. The child was thus able to be taken to live with 
the couple in America. The judge was of the opinion that 
the moral and ethical issues arising from the circumstances 
of the child's birth were not for the court to rule on. 
Application of Existing Statutes to Surrogacy 
Surrogacy is different from the black market adoptions 
envisaged by existing legislation. In a typical "baby 
buying" situation, an unmarried woman becomes pregnant 
accidentally and an intermediary arranges for the child to 
be adopted by a couple whose fitness as parents have not 
been professionally ascertained. 
In contrast, the surrogate voluntarily becomes pregnant 
and bears a child by pre-arrangement for a couple, one of 
whom is biologically related to the child. The decision to 
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give the child up for adoption is not the result of an 
unplanned pregnancy but is an informed and deliberate 
choice. 
If a surrogate voluntarily relinquishes custody of her 
child to the biological father of the child, there appears 
to be little justification to prohibit her from receiving 
payment. The payment is an arrangement between the parents 
of the child, and not as between one parent and a stranger 
to the child. It is not unknown for a man to pay 
maintenance to a woman to whom he feels some moral 
obligation to maintain, even in the absence of a legal 
marriage between the man and the woman. In the United 
States, this form of maintenance, commonly known as 
"palimony" is often a matter of litigation on the part of 
the woman. In a surrogacy arrangement, the father of the 
child has arranged with a woman to provide him with a child. 
In consideration for her services, the surrogate is paid a 
fee. This is hardly the situation envisaged by the 
legislatures at the time when the existing legislation 
prohibiting black market adoptions were enacted. 
Existing legislation does not contemplate the 
relinquishment of custody of a child other than a legally 
recognized form of adoption. Without such an adoption, the 
child remains the legal child of the woman who gave birth to 
it - the surrogate. 
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The short and long term effects of the payment of a fee 
on the infertile couple and the child need to be studied to 
determine the long-term or short-term result on the 
psychology of the parties. Regarding the surrogate's 
position, it is possible to argue that financial gain may 
have an undue influence on a woman to become a surrogate. 
It may be quite pertinent to question how much money it 
would take to change a woman's voluntary decision to become 
a surrogate into an involuntary one. 
Most of the surrogates surveyed by Parker176 required 
the payment of a fee which covered more than the expenses 
incurred. However, this profit motive was always 
accompanied by at least two other major factors which 
contributed to their decision. One was the satisfaction 
gained by the enjoyment of the pregnancy itself and the gift 
of a child, while the other was a personal desire to 
experience again the loss of a previous child through 
adoption or abortion. The surrogates surveyed did not 
regard the payment of a fee paid after the delivery of the 
baby as payment in exchange of parental rights and 
responsibilities, but viewed it as payment for their 
services. Parker suggests that preliminary data does not 
reveal any significant difference in the short term 
psychological results between surrogates who received a fee 
after the delivery compared with surrogates who did not 
177 receive any fees at all. 	Parker goes on to suggest that 
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the study of the effects on the parties of payment of a fee 
should differentiate between four major types of payments. I78 
First, the payment •of out of pocket expenses; second, a fee 
for the services of insemination, pregnancy, labour, and 
delivery; third, the payment equivalent to the value of 
opportunities foregone because of the pregnancy; fourth, a 
fee for the transfer of parental rights. The payment of any 
combination of these four payments may have a different 
effect on each of the parties involved. The effect on a 
child of the knowledge that payment was made to create and 
obtain him may be lessened or heightened depending on which 
type of payment was made and the attitude of the parties 
towards that payment. The effect on the infertile couple 
may include feelings of guilt. Parker concludes that in 
order to make rational, legal, moral, and policy judgments 
about the desirability or otherwise of permitting surrogacy 
arrangements, the question of the effects of such payments 
need to be studied. 179 
The statutes, when applied to surrogacy agreements, 
rather than preventing commercialization of adoption, 
prevent the promotion and creation of a family. The 
concentration on the commercial aspect of surrogacy 
agreements misses the main issue as to whether such 
agreements should be permitted. If they are to be 
permitted, there is no reason why a fee should not be paid 
to compensate for the costs and expenses involved in 
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participating in such a potentially painful and hazardous 
experience. 
If existing legislation is used in relation to new 
situations, reasonable construction must be given to give 
effect to the purpose of the statute to avoid unjust 
application of the law and absurd consequences. This is 
especially so where Statutes provide criminal sanctions. 
Any ambiguity regarding the intended scope of such statutes 
should arguably be resolved on the side of leniency. With 
respect to the prohibition on payment in connection with an 
adoption, the court ought to consider the intent of the 
prohibition. It is unlikely that these Statutes intended to 
cover surrogacy arrangements as these arrangements have 
only come to public attention in recent years - quite some 
time after the Statutes were enacted. Another point to 
consider is that any payment made in a surrogacy arrangement 
can be identified as payment for the surrogate's services 
and not for the ultimate adoption and therefore falls 
outside the ambit of the prohibition. 
Conclusion 
It is no easy matter to balance the arguments for and 
against the question of whether - a surrogacy agreement is legal 
or even valid. The principle of freedom of contact together 
with the interests of the infertile couple in establishing a 
family are factors to be considered. On the other hand, the 
child's welfare is of paramount importance. 
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The main objection to surrogacy arrangements appears to 
be the commercial aspect whereby a child is perceived to be 
bought and sold in a "baby-selling" transaction and the 
potential exploitive nature of the arrangement. The term 
"baby-selling" is misused in the context of surrogacy. The 
child is not "sold" as an object or a slave; rather the 
surrogate is compensated for her services and the 
relinquishment of her parental rights and responsibilities. 
The agreement that a child is handed over only to a couple 
who is willing to buy the privilege, is based on the idea 
that only the wealthy could afford to, and only the needy 
would need to, enter into surrogacy arrangements. This 
problem does exist, but is easily overcome if all surrogacy 
arrangements are regulated, and subject to strict 
conditions, including that of a payment of reasonable fees 
and expenses to compensate for the services of the 
surrogate. In the United States, where blood is "donated" 
for money, the sale of blood is regarded as a service to the 
community. It is not such a wide gap then to regard the 
"sale" of genetic material as a service. It can hardly be 
argued that the amount offered to a surrogate is an offer 
too good to refuse, considering the risks, effort, and time 
involved in a pregnancy. "For nine month's work, 24 hours a 
day, it comes out as El an hour". 180. In the United States, 
a sperm "donor" is paid for "time spent" - usually for half 
an hour's "work". 
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A man may sell his sperm to help the wife of an 
infertile husband to have a child by the means of artificial 
insemination (AID) and be well regarded by the community for 
his services. Yet, it is generally considered to be against 
public policy, and specifically a crime in United Kingdom 
and the State of Victoria, for a woman to sell her services 
to help the infertile wife of a husband to have a baby by 
the means of a surrogacy arrangement. 
Surrogacy is a natural complement to AID and can be 
viewed as a superior form of adoption, similar to 
step-parent adoption where one of the parents is the 
biological parent. 
Although significant technical differences occur 
between the practice of AID and the practice of surrogacy, 
the donor of a female gamete should not be regarded in such 
a different light as the donor of the male gamete. 
Women should have a right to use their bodies as they 
wish - if the law gives them this right regarding abortion, 
! which is seen by manY as the extinguishment of life, why 
should the law not allow them the right to use their body to 
create a life, albeit for another couple. Seen in this 
light, it is an act of generosity, and is a step not taken 
lightly. With proper screening procedures, unsuitable women 
, would not be permitted to enter into a surrogacy 
arrangement. The danger of the wealthy couple exploiting a 
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poor surrogate is further diminished if the fees for the 
services of the surrogate are strictly regulated and tailor 
made to fit the particular circumstances of each case. 
Where the intended father is the biological father of the 
resultant child, the argument of buying his child does not 
stand up. 
From the viewpoint of the child, the principle that the 
welfare of the child is of paramount consideration is often 
stated. The payment to the surrogate for her services is 
equated with treating the child as a commodity, to be bought 
and sold. However, the biological father of the child, who 
helped to create the child is compensating a woman for her 
part in nurturing and bearing the child in place of his wife 
who is unable to perform this activity. He is caring for 
the child he has created - a far different situation from 
that envisaged by those who enacted legislation banning 
payment in connection with the adoption of a baby. 
Another major objection arises from the religious 
concept of marriage as the basis for procreation and 
parenthood. The practice of surrogacy brings a third person 
into the marital relationship and clearly separates 
procreation from sexual intercourse, and procreation from 
rearing a child. This intrusion is seen to be worse than 
that of a semen donor in AID cases as the contribution of 
the surrogate is more intimate and personal. However, if 
procreation and parenthood are seen to be the reasons for 
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marriage, the failure to achieve these results may seriously 
undermine the marital relationship. If a woman cannot have 
children, she and her husband should have the right to 
fulfil their desire for parenthood with whatever reasonable 
means are available. Surrogacy in most of these cases is 
the only serious option, -given the scarcity of babies 
available for adoption. Those couples who feel strongly 
. against the use of surrogacy need not seek-out such 
arrangements, but access in general should not be denied 
merely on these grounds. 
The problem of the effect on the surrogate of 
relinquishing her child is of some concern and there can be 
found some analogy in adoption procedures. However, in 
surrogacy, the mother makes the decision to bear a child for 
. another in advance of pregnancy and relinquishment is seen 
; by her as the final stage of that decision. She is not 
forced into it by the circumstances surrounding the cause of 
pregnancy. It is to be recognized that relinquishing her 
child will in some cases-cause the surrogate some 
stress, but thatpof itself,should not be a reason for 
outright prohibition on the practice of surrogacy. 
In a jurisdiction which regulates and carefully 
, controls surrogacy arrangements, provision should be made to 
allow a surrogate to keep her child. 
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The problem of a defective child rejected by the 
surrogate and the infertile couple is another sensitive 
issue that needs careful handling. It is not an uncommon 
situation in the community at large, where the reaction of 
the parents is often total rejection,-sometimes to the point 
of refusing permission to carry out life-saving operations. 
However, the incidence of abnormality at birth is not so 
high as to make it an expected occurrence and therefore a 
ground to prohibit surrogacy. 
One point that appears to be missed when stating an 
objection to the deliberate creation of a child for the 
benefit of others, is that millions of unplanned babies are 
born to unwilling parents. The fate of these babies, is far 
more precarious than the fate of a child who has been 
planned in advance and eagerly awaited to be reared by 
loving people willing to assume parental obligations. 
These grounds, taken individually or together, are not 
of themselves sufficient to place an outright ban on the 
practice of surrogacy and to impose penal sanctions. 
Surrogacy offers too much of a viable alternative to 
disappear simply because it is banned. Criminalizing it 
will only cause it to flourish illegally where exploitation 
poses a real threat to all the parties involved. 
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It may be considered by some that because the problems 
associated with the practice of surrogacy may have emotional 
effects on children born as a result of such a practice, 
surrogacy should not be permitted. However, similar effects 
on adopted children and children born as a result of AID 
procedures have not been used as an argument militating 
against adoption or AID. The community does not view such 
procedures as outrageous or criminal, yet they present 
similar problems regarding the identity crisis of a child 
and the need for it to know its heredity. Adoption laws in 
Australia are being amended to reflect this need. There is 
no reason why laws on surrogacy could not do the same. 
The question is whether the decision to participate in 
a surrogacy arrangement should be a private matter for the 
parties to resolve and agree upon or whether there is 
sufficient State interest justified by the dictates of 
public policy to justify regulation. 
Society in general does not need protection from the 
use of surrogacy as a means of alleviating infertility. The 
individuals who do need protection are the infertile couple, 
the , surrogate, and most importantly, the child. This can 
only be achieved if surrogacy is recognized and regulated. 
Regulation by way of legislation should define the rights 
and duties of the parties, and specify the requirements 
necessary to ensure the health and welfare of all parties. 
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munwi 5 
STATUS OF THE CHILD UNDER CURRENT LEGISLATION 
A major concern is the determination of the parentage 
of a child born as a result of a surrogacy agreement as 
significant consequences flow from such determination. The 
legal status of the child affects, among other things, its 
rights of inheritance, maintenance, and custody. 
Paternity 
The term father is defined in the Oxford English 
Dictionary as a person who has begotten a child. At common 
law, the father of a child is the man whose sperm fertilizes 
the egg. The tests are quite clearly genetic. However this 
position may be altered by the application of statutory 
presumptions. Presumptions in law operate to promote the 
interests of the family and protect the child from the 
stigma of illegitimacy. 
181 The Status of Children Act 1974 (Tas.) 	abolished the 
common rule that no legal relationship exists between an 
illegitimate child and its natural father, and placed such a 
child in the same position as a legitimate child in respect 
of maintenance and intestacy. 
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Section 5 of the Status of Children Act 1974 (Tas.) 
'provides that a child born to a married woman during her 
marriage is presumed, in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, to be a child of that marriage. This presumption 
presents a problem in a surrogacy agreement where the 
.surrogate is married, as her husband, and not the biological 
- father, is presumed to be the father of the child. 
Of course, contrary evidence can be produced by several 
means by establishing that sexual intercourse occurred 
between the surrogate and the husband of the infertile 
couple (which is unlikely where artificial insemination is 
used), by proof of non-access between the surrogate mother 
- and her husband, by evidence of her husband's sterility, or 
by biological paternity tests carried out on the child and 
all parties. Blood.tests cannot prove that a certain man is 
the father of a certain child but with a 93% accuracy, can 
exclude a man as father of the child. New developments in 
DNA fingerprints can now provide positive proof of paternity 
in 99% of the cases. 182 
However, such testing requires the co-operation of the 
surrogate's husband. Where a dispute about custody of a 
child arises in a surrogacy arrangement, and evidence was 
given that the surrogate's husband could not be the father 
of the child, the court may determine that the child is not 
the child of the marriage. However, establishing that fact 
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may not help the parties in deciding custody. The court is 
unlikely, under current practice, to accept the surrogacy 
arrangement as a means by which such a dispute is to be settled. 
The court is unlikely to force an unwilling natural father to 
take custody of his child where the surrogate is demanding that 
he do so. This may well be contrary to the welfare of the child. 
The court may need to consider the question of damages payable to 
the surrogate, but such an order is based on the acceptance of 
the surrogacy arrangement as an enforceable contract. The court 
is similarly unlikely to force a reluctant surrogate to 
relinquish her child to the natural father. The same problems 
arise. Until legislation specifically dealing with the issues 
involved in surrogacy is enacted, these problems have little 
chance of being solved. 
The position regarding children born as a result of 
artificial insemination by donor (AID) procedures has been 
clarified with the result that parenthood of such children are 
determined in a manner which is appropriate to the intention of 
the parties to such procedures. 
Section 10C of the Status of Children Act 1974 
(Tas.)185 determines the parenthood of a child born as a 
result of AID or IVF procedures. With respect to paternity, 
the husband who has consented to his wife undergoing either 
of those procedures is treated in law as the father of any 
child born as a result of such procedures and the donor of 
the sperm used in the procedure is treated in law as if he 
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were not the father of such a child. 
The purpose of ensuring the husband's consent is to 
free him from the obligation of supporting a child where his 
wife seeks AID and he does not want to have a child. It 
also serves to free the donor of the sperm from any 
obligation to support a child he did not himself want. 
However, it is difficult to see why such a consent is 
vital to determining the paternity of a child. Certainly, 
the presumption of the husband's consent is rebuttable - 
section 10(5) - but, if it is rebutted, section 5 of the Act 
may be relevant in presuming the child to be a child of the 
marriage anyway. There is no indication as to which section 
is paramount. 	But, if evidence to the contrary is 
established, a child, whether in a surrogacy situation or 
not, may end up with no legal father. 
Where a surrogate is married and whether AID or natural 
procedures are used, either the surrogate's husband is 
treated as the father of the resultant child and the sperm 
donor is not (section 10C) or the child is a child of their 
marriage (section 5). Either result has the effect of 
undermining the purpose of the surrogacy agreement and the 
biological and intended father is required to rebut the 
presumptions in both section 5 and section 10C in order to 
establish his paternity. He then faces the problem 
presented in section 10C(2) which states that he, as donor 
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of the semen used in AID or IVF procedures shall not be 
treated in law as the father of a child born as a result of 
such a procedure. 
The biological father may find section 8 useful. 
Section 8(1) provides that the entry of the name of a person 
named as the father of a child in the Register of Births is 
prima facie evidence that the person so named is the father 
of the child. Section 8(2) provides that an instrument by a 
person acknowledging paternity of a child is prima facie  
evidence that the person named as the father is the father 
of the child. However, the relationship between section 
8(1) and (2) and section 10C(2) is unclear. There appears 
to be areas of conflict in applying the provisions which 
cater for children born as a result of AID or IVF procedures 
to children born as a result of surrogacy agreements where 
the surrogate is married. 
The position would be far less complicated where the 
surrogate is unmarried. The biological and intended social 
father is regarded in law as the natural father of the child 
provided he has acknowledged paternity. However, a problem 
arises if for some reason the natural father refuses to 
acknowledge paternity and refuses to accept the child. 
Section 10C(2) rules out the sperm donor as the father and 
thus the child is left with no legal father. 
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Maternity 
Where in a surrogacy agreement, the surrogate receives 
an embryo transfer (ET) the question of maternity also 
raises complex issues. Using the procedure of ET, the 
surrogate carries an embryo in her uterus which has been 
formed by the fertilization of the infertile couple's own 
gametes, or by the wife's ova and donor sperm or by donor 
ova and donor sperm. The technique of ET may be used where 
the wife can produce healthy ova but is unable for medical 
reasons to carry a child in her uterus. 
With the changes in procreation techniques now 
available, motherhood is a changing concept of increasingly 
uncertain ambit. 
Traditionally, the concept of motherhood involves 
• procreation and gestation as one inseparable notion. The 
law regards the woman who gives birth to a child as the 
mother of the child. Section 5 of the Status of Children 
Act 1974 (Tas.) 184  presumes a child born to a woman during 
her marriage as a child of the marriage. This appears to 
contemplate that the woman giving birth is the child's legal 
mother. However, that section relates more to the status of 
the child as a child of the marriage than as to who is the 
child's mother. 
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Section 10C(3) and (4) of the Status of Children Act 
1974 (Tas.)185 provides that a woman who bears a child as a 
result of AID or IVF using donated ovum is treated in law as 
the mother of the child and the ovum donor is not the 
mother. The technique of ET introduces an extra dimension 
as the embryo is a genetic stranger to the surrogate who 
actually carries and eventually gives birth. Before the 
advent of such a technique, the legal position of mother and 
child arose from physical and biological certainty. The 
maxim of mater semper certa est may need to be re-examined 
in the light of these new techniques and especially in the 
area of surrogacy. 
The difficulty is in deciding whether the donation of 
genetic material gives right to a claim of motherhood or 
whether the gestational contribution and eventual delivery 
justifies such a claim. A confusing picture emerges where 
the law itself cannot make up its mind. In the case of 
Corbett v Corbett,186 there was judicial acceptance of the 
significance of genetic determination in deciding the sex 
of a person. This may influence courts to find that genetic 
rather than gestational contribution should also be a 
deciding factor in deciding maternity. On the other hand, 
the Status of Children Act 1974 (Tas.) has negated the 
significance of genetic contribution in determining the 
maternity (and for the most part, paternity) of a child born 
as a result of those procedures. The legislation was 
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enacted to accord to such a child the status that was 
intended by the use of those procedures. The donors of any 
genetic material used were never intended to be the parents 
of the child. The analogy with a surrogate agreement is 
quite clear. The intended parents in a surrogacy 
arrangement are determined by the terms of the surrogacy 
agreement. 
It is submitted that a court faced with a surrogacy 
case would be more likely to hold that the surrogate giving 
birth was the natural mother. This view would more 
readily conform with the general concept of motherhood 
which recognizes the birth-giving woman as the mother. 
Certainly the birth-giving woman is easily identified. 
Problems involving proof of genetic parentage are avoided. 
The Status of Children Act 1974 (Tas.), section 10E187 gives 
effect to this view by stating that the woman who gives birth to 
a child from a donated ovum is the mother of that child and the 
rights and obligations of the genetic parents are extinguished. 
However, these provisions were designed specifically to cover AID 
and In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) procedures, and therefore define' 
parenthood in terms which satisfy the needs and meet the 
intentions of the parties involved in such procedures. To apply 
these provisions to surrogacy arrangements is to apply the needs 
and criteria of a completely different set of circumstances which 
involve intentions opposite to those involved in surrogacy 
arrangements. 
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Bonding 
The bonding of the child to the birth-giving mother is 
said to have important effects on the child. Not enough is 
known of the extent to which bonding occurs in the uterus. 
Bonding after birth has a strong effect on the relationship 
between the baby and its mother. But if the baby's mother 
is deemed to be the infertile woman who takes custody of the 
baby as soon after birth as is possible, the bonding then 
occurs between the baby and the intended mother. The issue 
of bonding is also present in adoption, yet it has not been 
mentioned as a reason against adoption. 
Conclusion 
It is becoming increasingly evident that the notion of 
motherhood has to meet the changes that are occurring in 
reproductive techniques. The time has come when it may be 
necessary to divide the notion of motherhood between the 
genetic mother and the gestational mother. Both may 
establish evidence of motherhood and neither can negate the 
motherhood of the other. 
Legislation relating to AID and IVF was not intended to 
cover surrogacy agreements. The courts are unlikely to 
extend the scope of such legislation in order to include 
circumstances that were not contemplated. As the Court of 
188 Appeal held in Syrkowski v Appleyard, 	legal recognition 
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is of legislative concern and not for judicial pre-emption. 
If surrogacy is to be a recognized procedure to alleviate 
infertility, specific legislation is required to protect the 
rights of all those involved. 
Alternatives need to be found to the present 
presumptions of maternity and paternity. The determining 
factor should be based on what is in the best interests of 
the child. The child's welfare would best be served by 
deciding that its mother and father are the persons who 
intend to assume parental responsibility of the child, 
whether or not either has contributed any genetic material. 
The biological connection should not of itself be the 
determining factor, neither should the gestational 
contribution. This is not to deny the importance of either 
contribution. Indeed, the effect of the uterine environment 
and the host woman's activities on the development of the 
foetus cannot be ignored. 
One factor which needs to be taken into account in 
determining what is in the best interests of a child, is the 
intention of the parties involved in the arrangement. 
Where clearly only one party to the arrangement is willing 
to take custody of the child, be it the surrogate or the 
infertile couple, the welfare of the child would seem to 
• indicate that it would face a better future with the party 
that is, in the words of the Demack Report "committed to 
1 89 [the] nurture, education and support". 	This approach, of 
93. 
course, does not overcome the problem of the conflict that 
arises where both parties wish to take custody of the child, 
as is the case where the surrogate refuses to relinquish the 
child. It is unlikely, in the absence of specific legislation, 
that the courts would force a mother who is otherwise fit to 
be a mother, to give up her child. Where the child is not 
genetically hers, the courts may well have to re-examine the 
issues and for this reason, legislation should decide the matter. 
It is inappropriate to apply existing legislation aimed at 
defining parentage in AID and IVF procedures to surrogacy 
arrangements. A donor who is not legally recognized as a child's 
father, risks losing the child who is genetically his own, despite 
acknowledging his intention to be the father by the terms of the 
surrogate agreement. These provisions are based on defining 
parentage, especially paternity, on the assumption that the woman 
is married and emphasize the importance of the consent of the 
woman's husband to the AID or IVF procedures. In a surrogacy 
arrangement, if the surrogate is married, it is usual to obtain 
her husband's consent but not in order that he may be recognized 
legally as the father. On the contrary, he consents to the terms 
of the agreement whereby the sperm donor is recognized to be the 
father. The only way to ensure that the surrogate's husband is 
not treated in law as the father of the child, is for him to 
refuse the procedure of AID being carried out on his wife. 
However, this does not mean that the sperm donor is the father. 
He is specifically excluded. 
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To settle the separate issues of maternity and 
paternity in surrogacy arrangements, legislation is 
required. 
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CHAPTER 6 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Alternative Approaches to Surrogacy 
In order to meet the challenges which the practice of 
surrogacy faces, three possible approaches may be taken. The 
first approach is to legislate prohibiting the practice of 
surrogacy and providing penal sanctions against its use. This 
approach raises more problems than the ones it intends to remedy. 
The provision of penal sanctions is not the most effective 
or appropriate way to overcome the problems of surrogacy. 
Although the effect of such sanctions would be to prevent 
commercial exploitation by profit making agencies, it does 
mean that surrogacy arrangements would continue by private 
arrangements without the benefit of professional skills in 
screening and counselling and without safeguards to protect 
the interests of all the parties involved. The prohibition 
on the practice of surrogacy will not deter infertile 
couples desperate to have a child from entering such private 
agreements. A criminal sanction is difficult to enforce if 
• the parties collude to prevent detection that a surrogacy 
arrangement was in fact entered into and carried out. This 
is not to argue that crimes which are difficult to detect 
should not be crimes. Breaches of laws prohibiting 
homosexual acts between consenting adults are difficult to 
detect. The practice of surrogacy can be viewed as a means 
of achieving parenthood, which in itself is not a crime. 
96. 
Prohibiting surrogacy will mean that the status of a 
child born in contravention of such legislation is at best 
unsettled, while the fate of its creators is at worst 
imprisonment. Neither of these two results do anything to 
promote the advancement and stability of the family. 
The second approach is to allow the practice of 
surrogacy to develop through private contract and by 
judicial determination according to each individual case. 
This approach is based on the premise that specific 
legislation permitting surrogacy cannot foresee all possible 
new developments and problems in this area. However 
legislation in other areas can be and is regularly updated 
whenever the need arises. There is nothing intrinsically 
different in the area of surrogacy from other legislative 
areas dealing in family matters._ This approach would 
probably result in a patchy and difficult to follow case 
law. Private contract without regulation at its inception 
is not the best system in which the interests of the child, 
who is not a party to the contract, can be fully protected. 
It can lead to exploitation of the weaker party, the 
surrogate, who may be unable to bargain equally if her 
financial status was a critical factor. This approach also 
fails to provide, as a matter of course, the initial 
screening and counselling procedures which are important to 
ensure that the arrangement is one which all parties ought 
to enter into. 
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The third and recommended approach is to legislate in 
favour of the practice of surrogacy. This approach will 
enable infertile couples to fulfil their desires for a child 
of their own, will shield the surrogate from the risks of 
exploitation, and above all, will protect the welfare of the 
child - who will inevitably be born in spite of any 
legislation outlawing his creation. 
It is recommended that surrogacy agencies be 
established within appropriate government departments. Such 
agencies would take full responsibilities for the screening 
and counselling of prospective parents and surrogates in 
relation to their genetic, physical and psychological 
fitness to participate. The criteria for final selection 
should be clearly stated in the legislation. 
As with adoption provisions, surrogacy should, at this 
stage, be made available only to heterosexual couples, 
whether legally married or not. To allow a single person to 
use the services of a surrogate is to intentionally deprive 
the resultant child of a second parent. Although this often 
happens in the case of divorce or the death of one parent, 
it has not been the intention of the parents that any 
children they have may be brought up in a one-parent family. 
The basic reason for allowing a couple to have a child by 
artificial procedures is to give them an opportunity of 
establishing their family and to ensure that the child is 
born into a normal traditional family relationship. 190 
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However, to restrict the procedure to couples may be 
discrimination. 
To allow the use of such procedures by lesbian couples 
or homosexual couples does create further problems to the 
child. The child would be brought up, not in a family which 
is recognized by the community as a "normal" family, but in 
a family which is not recognized by the community and may 
suffer as a consequence. Both these issues must be decided 
in the best interests of the child. 
The use of a surrogate as a matter of convenience for 
the wife should not be permitted. Surrogacy should be 
viewed as an arrangement made for the purpose of enabling 
childless couples who are unable to bear a child to 
have a child where all other avenues are unavailable. It 
has been argued that to allow the practice of surrogacy in 
cases for convenience of the wife who does not wish to be 
involved in a pregnancy is to manipulate human life at 
. 191 personal whim. 	Legislation is much more likely to be 
acceptable to the community if necessity is made the only 
rationale for permitting surrogacy to those who will benefit 
from its practice. If community standards in the future are 
able to accept the notion of surrogacy for convenience, 
legislation could be enacted to cover that situation. 
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Parties should be permitted to enter into surrogacy 
agreements which are supervised by the appropriate 
government agency. Legislation should provide that certain 
terms are to be mandatory in all such agreements. One such 
term would specify the level of medical and self care the 
surrogate is expected to take, including the circumstances 
in which she may have the foetus aborted. An abortion 
should only be carried out if the continuation of the 
pregnancy would present a real danger to the life or health 
of the surrogate, or where pre-natal tests show a defective , 
foetus and all the parties consent to the abortion. If one 
party withholds consent, then the pregnancy should continue 
and that person is to be responsible for the child. 
Another mandatory provision would cover what expenses 
and fees are payable. It is suggested that any payment 
should be made to the agency and should be for medical 
expenses up to six weeks after the birth, compensation if 
the surrogate miscarries, living expenses, payment of 
premiums or a life insurance, and a certain sum for 
services. The consent of all parties, including the spouse 
of a surrogate, should be required to the transfer of 
parental rights after paternity has been proved. 
Legislation should also provide for the status of the 
child by clearly defining who the legal mother and legal 
father of the child is. In a surrogacy situation, it is the 
couple who the surrogacy agreement contemplated as parents, 
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regardless of their individual or combined donation of 
genetic material. At birth, the child is provisionally 
deemed to be the child of his intended parents. Tests to 
prove, where appropriate, the paternity of the husband, are 
to be carried out within-seven days of the birth. If the 
tests prove positive, and the child is handed over, the 
court issues an order which enables the intended parents to 
register the child as their legal child. In this way, 
formal adoption under the Adoption of Children Act 1968 
(Tas.) is bypassed and therefore the problems associated 
with the payment of fees in connection with an adoption are 
avoided. 
If the surrogate refuses to hand over the child she 
should not be compelled to relinquish her child if she is 
the biological mother. However, with careful screening 
before participation in a surrogacy agreement, this problem 
would seldom arise. However, any payments made should be 
reimbursed. 
Provision should also be made as to what is to happen 
in the event of a multiple birth, a defective child, the 
death of either one or both of the intended parents, or 
their divorce. These matters may be left to be decided by 
the parties, subject to the overall control of the 
appropriate government department. 
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The anonymity of the surrogate should be assured with 
the proviso •that her medical background be available for any 
future use. However, with the recent trend of releasing 
parental information to adult adoptees at their request, 
this aspect may also need to be considered. 
It has been the usual practice where children have been 
born as a result of AID procedures to hide this fact and 
register the child as the child of the intended parents. In 
Victoria, unlike other States, it is no longer an offence 
for the intended parents, instead of the biological parents, 
to register as parents in the Register of Births. The 
Adoption Act 1984 (Vic.)- 92 makes provision for this and 
also enables adopted persons to seek and gain access to 
identifying information regarding their family origins. 193 
That Act also gives reciprocal rights to natural parents, 194 
natural relatives, 195 and adoptive parents 195 to seek 
certain information about the adopted person. 
Children born as a result of reproductive techniques 
should not be treated differently from other children so 
that the records of their origins are hidden and 
inaccessible. The elimination of secrecy and distortion of 
information relating to family relationships, medical 
backgrounds, and family origins is vital to the healthy 
social and psychological development of children in their 
families. 197 It is also important for society in general to 
ensure that birth records accurately reflect actual parentage. 
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However, the surrogate needs to be protected, if she so 
wishes, from being •identified as the biological mother. 
Birth registers should be maintained by the appropriate 
government agency to keep accurate record of both biological 
parents and new family relationships that are created 
outside the biological links. Access to such information 
should be made available to persons who are seeking their 
genealogical connections. 
By placing the practice of surrogacy under the control 
and guidance of the State, the community may be assured that 
the most vulnerable of its members are protected from the 
dangers inherent in clandestine or uncontrolled 
arrangements. Potential financial exploitation of the 
surrogate can be avoided by ensuring that surrogacy 
arrangements meet certain requirements. - Screening and 
counselling of all parties ensure that the participants are 
made fully aware of the issues involved and that most 
potential problems are avoided. Strict guidelines will go a 
long way towards securing the best interests of the child 
born as a result of a surrogacy arrangement if those 
guidelines are set with the child's welfare in mind. 
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Conclusion 
The gift of life is precious. To create a longed-for 
child for a couple unable to conceive and bear a child 
within their marriage or relationship is surely a noble 
need. The fact that recompense may be made to the woman who 
offers to carry the foetus to term within her body does not 
derogate from the miracle of the birth of a baby. What is 
against public policy and against the welfare of a child, is 
that the child born as a result of a surrogacy arrangement 
will, unless he receives protection from the State, be born 
in "no-man's land" - a land where no man is his legal 
father or his legal father is a man who has no genetic or 
intended link with him. 
The State has a major responsibility to protect the 
welfare and interests of all children. The prohibition and 
criminalization of the practice of surrogacy is against the 
welfare and interest of the child born as a result of a 
prohibited surrogacy arrangement. The legal status of such 
a child would have to be determined under legislation which 
is not designed to cover such situations with the most 
likely result that he would not be deemed to be the child of 
his intended parents. If adoption procedures are 
unavailable to the infertile couple, the child would live 
with them in a legal limbo, legally belonging to someone 
else. Prohibiting the practice ignores the plight of the 
child if a dispute were to arise as to his custody and 
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therefore fails to protect his interests. The advantages of 
legislation which clearly defines parenthood and provides 
for custody and adoption would bring certainty into an area 
which is confused at present and is in danger of becoming 
increasingly complex. There is no doubt that surrogacy will 
continue despite any legal sanctions. 
The issues central to the debate on whether or not 
surrogacy should be permitted are how society views the 
concept of motherhood and how society should react to 
reproductive technology and the changes it has brought to 
the accepted standards of procreation. 
Only by permitting the practice of surrogacy and 
legislating for its control and regulation can the interests 
of the child and also of the other parties be fully 
protected. Even if only one child were to be born into this 
"no-man's" land, the State has a duty towards that child, 
not to penalize his creators, but to safeguard his status in 
society. 
As long as the family remains the basic unit of 
society, infertile couples will seek to find a means of 
alleviating their plight of childlessness. The practice of 
surrogacy offers such couples a realistic and viable 
solution. 
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APPENDIX 
RELATIONSHIPS IN SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS 
H = infertile husband D = donor 
W = infertile wife S = sperm 
SM = surrogate mother 0 = ovum 
genetic link of 
child to 
H &W 
SH + OSM - H is biological father 1 genetic link 
W is intended mother 
SM is biological mother 
SH + OW 	- H + W are biological parents - 2 genetic links 
SM is gestational mother 
SH + OD 	- H is biological father 1 genetic link 
W is intended mother 
SM is gestational mother 
SD + OW 	- H is intended father 
W is biological mother 1 genetic link 
SM is gestational mother 
SD + OSM - H + W are intended parents 
- 
no genetic links 
SM is biological mother 
SD + OD - H + W are intended parents no genetic links 
SM is gestational mother 
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POSTSCRIPT 
Since completing the thesis, 2 developments in the area 
of surrogacy indicate a change in judicial thinking on some 
important issues. 
The issue of commercialism involved in the adoption of 
a child born as a result of a surrogacy agreement was 
discussed in a recent case in the United Kingdom. 198 A 
•married couple applied to the court for an adoption order in 
their favour in respect of the natural child of the husband 
born by natural conception, as a result of a surrogacy 
arrangement with another woman. Latey J held that the 
• surrogacy arrangement did not contravene section 50(1) of 
the Adoption Act 1958 which prohibits any payment or reward 
made in connection with the adoption of a child. He 
concluded that as the amount of £5000 paid to the surrogate 
did not cover her loss of earnings and expenses, there was 
no element of profit or reward in the arrangement. Even if 
the payment were to be characterized as a payment or reward 
within section 50(1), Latey J was of the view that the 
court, when considering the welfare of the child, has 
discretion to authorize any payment or reward which has 
been, or may be, paid in such cases. 
198. Reported as Re an Adoption Application: Surrogacy, 
Family Division, March 11, 1987 in (1987) New Law 
Jnl., 267. 
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In the United States, the case of "Baby M" 199 , Judge 
Harvey Sorkow (New Jersey) made legal history in April 1987 
by ruling that the surrogacy contract made between Mr. and 
Mrs. Stern and a surrogate Mrs. Whitehead was binding and 
awarded custody of the child born as a result of that 
contract to the Sterns. The case has provoked much 
criticism both before and after the ruling, some of it 
because of the surrogate's behaviour and some because of the 
judge's comments on her character. It would seem that the 
judge was of the view that it was in the best interests of 
the child to remain with the Sterns. There is no doubt that 
all parties have gone through agonizing times clearly, the 
present law of contract is inadequate to solve custody 
disputes in surrogacy cases. 
As a final point, it is interesting to note that a 
national survey conducted by the New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission, believed to be the first opinion survey in the 
world on surrogacy, found that 51% of the 2500 people polled 
were in favour of surrogacy, 33% disapproved, while 13% 
expressed no opinion. 2 " The majority were in favour of 
paying the surrogate a fee plus expenses. However, on the 
question of custody of the child, about a third thought the 
married couple should have custody while 26% thought the 
surrogate should and 25% believed a court should decide. 
199. See page 58 and note 131 ante. 
200. Reported in The Mercury, 20 May 1987. 
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